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ABSTRACT: The last decade has seen the development of a burgeoning literature on the
relationship between international trade and the protection of human rights, driven in part
by a series of influential reports produced by the Office of the UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights. Some human rights commentators have been heavily critical of the
trade regime, pointing to a variety of ways in which obligations under international trade
law purportedly undermine the ability of governments to fulfil their human rights
obligations. Others see the potential for strong synergies between the two regimes, and
argue that international trade can be a powerful force for raising global standards of
human rights protection.

This paper argues that the contemporary trade and human rights literature is seriously
flawed, in two related ways. First, this literature has developed without any clear and
explicit thinking about what human rights actors and human rights language bring to
trade policy debates. As a result, serious engagement between trade and human rights
scholars has been hampered. To help remedy this defect, the paper offers (and critiques)
five distinct models for thinking about the function that the human rights movement is
currently playing in debates about the future of the international trading system. Most
importantly, it suggests that the human rights movement acts as a ‘trigger’ for policy
learning in the field of international trade.
Second, the paper argues that accounts of the ‘human rights impact’ of the international
trade regime are too often one-dimensional and over-simplified. This is because they
focus solely on the constraints imposed on governments by international trade law.
Drawing on a variety of institutionalist literatures from political sociology and political
science, the paper show how the trade regime acts through normative and cognitive
channels to socialize participants – rather than merely regulate their behaviour – and
thereby helps to define and constitute their trade policy preferences. Attention to these
more complicated processes is important because they can be harnessed to help produce
an international trading order which is yet more conducive to the protection of human
rights.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

There is a story, told by a former member of the Office of the High Commissioner for
Human Rights, of a visit she received some years ago from the “Geneva trade
representative of a major developed country”. The trade representative had heard that the
OHCHR was preparing a series of reports on the trade regime: they had come to ask why,
and expressed “sheer incredulity that a trade agreement was any business of a UN human
rights institution”.1 The ‘trade and human rights’ debate has clearly come a long way
since those days, in which it was a struggle even to convince many of any connection
between the two fields. There is now a relatively widely-held view that the connections
between international trade and human rights are interesting and in need of investigation.
The literature on the subject is already large and growing – not only in quantity, but also
in its range of participants, the scope of its subject matter, and its mainstream appeal.
Nevertheless, while this literature has without doubt produced much work of great value,
taken as a whole it is flawed in at least two serious ways. First, it lacks clear and explicit
thinking about what human rights actors and human rights language contribute to trade
policy debates – what function they perform, and what distinctive ‘value-added’ they
bring. As long as thinking about this issue remains unclear and poorly articulated, serious
engagement between trade and human rights scholars will continue to be hampered, and
participants on all sides of the debate will in many cases continue to talk past one
another. Second, the debate has so far proceeded on the basis of an unduly limited, and in
many ways misleading, map of the ways in which the international trade regime affects
the effective protection of human rights. Since it is on the basis of this map that critiques
and reformative proposals are generated, the result has been that the trade and human
rights debates has so far produced a relatively narrow and constrained transformative
agenda. In this article, I substantiate these two critiques, and offer some thoughts as to
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how those interested in progressing the trade and human rights debate might respond to
them.
The social history of the trade and human rights debate is yet to be written, and we still
have no fully satisfactory story about who and what provided its initial impetus, or the
factors that have shaped its progression since then. For now, however, it is perhaps
enough to provide a brief impressionistic survey of some of the basic features of the
literature. Among the most central of those features must be the work of UN human
rights institutions on the impact of the international trading system on the enjoyment of
human rights. This began formally around 1999, with the initiation of a broad work
programme under the rubric of ‘Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all
human rights’.2 Among the first fruits of this programme was a report of that name by
Oloka-Onyango and Udagama dealing, among other matters, with a variety of critiques of
the World Trade Organization.3 While it is remembered by some as controversial4 - and it
certainly was critical – to a large extent the authors’ critiques of the trading system
simply reflected and responded to the strength of contemporary concerns about
globalization. But perhaps the most sustained and influential contribution has come from
the High Commissioner’s office, in the form of a series of (so far) six reports. The first,
released in 2001, addressed the TRIPs agreement and its impact on human health, and
since then the topics covered have included agricultural liberalization and the right to
food, the liberalization of trade in services, investment liberalization, and the principles
of non-discrimination and participation as they apply in the context of trade policy.5
2

See, for example, the resolution of the Commission on Human Rights, ‘Globalization and its impact on
the full enjoyment of all human rights’, E/CN/4/RES/1999/59, 28 April 1999; and the General Assembly
resolution of the same name, A/RES/54/165, 17 December 1999. This program, according to Zagel, was in
turn in part the result of attention directed to the issue at a variety of large UN Conferences in the preceding
years, such as International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo 1994), World Summit for
Social Development (Copenhagen 2005) and the Fourth Conference on Women (Beijing 1995), see G.
Zagel, 'WTO and Human Rights: Examining Linkages and Suggesting Convergences', (2005) 2(2) IDLO
Voices of Development Jurists, 27.
3
‘Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of all human rights’, Preliminary Report,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/13, 15 June 2000; Progress report, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/10, 2 July 2001; Final Report,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/14, 25 June 2003.
4
As a result of the phrasing of one sentence in the Preliminary Report, that report has come to be known in
some circles somewhat disparagingly as the ‘nightmare report’.
5
‘The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on human rights’,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13, 27 June 2001; ‘Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights’,
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While these reports certainly have a critical edge, they have taken a self-consciously and
consistently moderate line, stressing always that the international trading system can and
ought to work for the protection and promotion of human rights. They have been read and
distributed widely, and have been strongly influential in mobilizing and shaping the
present debate. Other bodies – including treaty-monitoring bodies – have also made
significant contributions to this broad work programme.6
Of course, this body of work did not arise in a vacuum, and UN human rights institutions
were not the first to make a connection between human rights and international trade.
This seems to have been an innovation of some elements of civil society, particularly in
the context of the campaigns conducted during the negotiation of both NAFTA and the
aborted Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI).7 In some ways, therefore, the UN
work programme was a response to civil society pressure, or at least to a growing
perception (arising in part as a consequence of these campaigns) that that international
trade matters ought to be a central part of modern human rights agenda. But, at the same
time, the work of UN human rights institutions has been a central driver in expanding and
directing that civil society agenda. The result is that at present non-governmental
E/CN.4/2002/54, 15 January 2002; ‘Liberalization of trade in services and human rights’,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002; ‘Human rights, trade and investment’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/9, 2 July
2003; ‘An analytical study on the fundamental principle of non-discrimination in the context of
globalization’, E/CN.4/2004/40, 15 January 2004; ‘Analytical study of the HCHR on the fundamental
principle of participation and its application in the context of globalization’, E/CN.4/2005/41, 23 December
2004. See also more recently, OHCHR, Human Rights and World Trade Agreements: Using general
exceptions clauses to protect human rights, (New York and Geneva: UN, 2005).
6
For a selection of other trade-related work carried out by a variety of UN bodies, see: the series of reports
from the Office of the Secretary-General under the common title of ‘Globalization and its impact on the full
enjoyment of all human rights’, A/55/342 (31 August 2000), A/56/254 (31 July 2001), A/59/320 (1
September 2004), A/60/301 (24 August 2005); the work of the Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, in particular its General Comments on the right to adequate food (E/C.12/1999/5, 12 May
1999), the right to education (E/C.12/1999/10, 8 December 1999), the right to the highest attainable
standard of health (E/C.12/2000/4, 11 August 2000), and the right to water (E/C.12/2002/11, 20 January
2003), as well as various statements made by the Committee, including at WTO Ministerials
(E/C.12/1999/9, E/C.12/2001/15); and the work of the Sub-Commission’s Special Rapporteur on the Right
to Health, eg, ‘The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and
mental health - Mission to the World Trade Organization’, E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1, 1 March 2004.
7
For some early work on trade and human rights arising from this context, see M. Mehra and International
NGO Committee on Human Rights in Trade and Investment, Human rights and economic globalisation:
directions for the WTO (1999); International Institute of Human Rights, Commerce mondial et protection
des droits de l'homme: les droits de l'homme à l'épreuve de la globalisation des échanges économiques /
World trade and the protection of human rights: human rights in face of global economic exchanges
(2001).
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organizations play a central and expanding role in the trade and human rights debate, and
have been some of the most important drivers of it. It is hard to single out the work of
particular NGOs without a large degree of arbitrariness, but the important place of civil
society in the trade and human rights debate can be seen in a number of different
developments: the diffusion of human rights language into the work of NGOs primarily
interested in trade matters; the trend among human rights NGOs to develop new expertise
and activities on international economic questions, as well as the significant growth in
groups – and networks – specifically mandated to work at the nexus between the trade
and human rights regimes, and to facilitate conversation between the two.8
Alongside the work of both UN institutions and civil society has arisen what is by now a
very large and diverse academic literature, produced by scholars of both the international
trading system and the human rights regime. A number of events and publications have
been important in generating a momentum and a sustained interest in the theme. From
2002 to 2004, the American Society of International Law, in co-operation with a number
of other institutions9, organised three influential conferences on trade and human rights,
the proceedings of which have been published relatively recently.10 Earlier, in 2001, a
lively and high-quality exchange of views between leading scholars in the pages of the
European Journal of International Law served to excite interest and raise the profile of

8

For those interested in perusing the work of NGOs in this area, the ESCR-Net network (www.escrnet.org) is a good starting point. Some NGOs active in the field include: 3D (Trade, Human Rights,
Equitable Economy); Amnesty International, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH);
Ethical Globalization Initiative (EGI); the Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL),
International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN); the Centre for International Trade and Development
(CECIDE); the People’s Movement for Human Rights Education (PDHRE); Dignity International;
Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AID); the Lutheran World Federation, and formerly the
International Centre for Human Rights in Trade and Investment (INCHRITI), among others. Some
prominent NGOs working closely on trade matters, such as Oxfam, Institute for Agriculture and Trade
Policy (IATP), Trade Law Centre for Southern Africa (TRALAC), and the Third World Network, have in
varying degrees also incorporated some aspects of human rights language into their publications.
9
Georgetown University Law Center, Max Planck-Institute for International Law (Heidelberg) and the
World Trade Institute (Berne).
10
T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005); F.M. Abbott,
C. Breining-Kaufman and T. Cottier (eds.), International Trade and Human Rights: Foundations and
Conceptual Issues (2006). See also the draft Seventh Report of the International Law Association,
International Trade Law Committee, http://www.ilahq.org/pdf/Trade%20Law/Draft%20Report%202006.pdf.
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the debate.11 More generally, there has been something of an explosion of conferences,
edited collections and monographs looking at impact of international trade on a wide
range of human rights, either as a topic in its own right, or as part of larger studies
looking at economic globalization more generally.12
An interesting dynamic of this scholarly literature (and indeed of the debate more
generally) has been its tendency to progressively expand its substantive scope: in many
ways, it seems as if the literature has proceeded by borrowing critiques of the trading
system originally developed in other contexts, and rearticulating them in human rights
language. Early on, discussions on ‘trade and human rights’ tended to concentrate on
essentially two main topics: human rights conditionality (particularly in respect of trading
relations between the US and China, Cuba and Burma13); and the labour and employment
11

P. Alston, 'Resisting the Merger and Acquisition of Human Rights by Trade Law: A Reply to
Petersmann', (2002) 13(4) European Journal of International Law 815; R. Howse, 'Human Rights in the
WTO: Whose Rights, What Humanity? Comment on Petersmann', (2002) 13(3) European Journal of
International Law 651; E.U. Petersmann, 'Time for a United Nations 'Global Compact' for Integrating
Human Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration', (2002)
13(3) European Journal of International Law 621; E.U. Petersmann, 'Taking Human Dignity, Poverty and
Empowerment of Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston', (2002) 13(4) European Journal of
International Law 845.
12
Among the vast literature, some early examples from a diversity of perspectives include: T. Evans and J.
Hancock, 'Doing Something Without Doing Anything: International Human Rights Law and the Challenge
of Globalisation', (1998) 2 International Journal of Human Rights 1; A.H. Qureshi, 'International trade and
human rights from the perspective of the WTO' in F. Weiss, E.M. Denters and P.J. de Waart (eds.),
International economic law with a human face (1998), 159; R. McCorquodale and R. Fairbrother,
'Globalization and Human Rights', (1999) 21(3) Human Rights Quarterly 735; M. Mehra and International
NGO Committee on Human Rights in Trade and Investment, Human rights and economic globalisation:
directions for the WTO (1999); A. Tay, 'The New Century, Globalisation and Human Rights', (2000) 8(2)
Asia Pacific Law Review 139; International Institute of Human Rights, Commerce mondial et protection
des droits de l'homme: les droits de l'homme à l'épreuve de la globalisation des échanges économiques /
World trade and the protection of human rights: human rights in face of global economic exchanges
(2001); A. Brysk, Globalization and human rights (2002); M. Gibney, Globalizing rights (2002); as well as
the Symposium issue, “The Universal Declaration at 50 and the Challenge of Global Markets” (1999) 25
Brooklyn Journal of International Law..
13
P. Alston, 'International Trade as an Instrument of Positive Human Rights Policy', (1982) 4(2) Human
Rights Quarterly 155; J.F. Smith, 'NAFTA and Human Rights: A Necessary Linkage', (1994) 27 UC Davis
Law Review 793; J.A. Dorn, 'Trade and Human Rights: The Case of China', (1996) 16(1) Cato Journal 77;
P. Stirling, 'The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mechanism for Basic Human Rights: A
Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organization', (1996) 11(1) American University Journal of
International Law and Policy 1; R.W. McGee, 'Trade Embargoes, Sanctions and Blockades - Some
Overlooked Human Rights Issues', (1998) 32(4) Journal of World Trade 139; C. McCrudden, 'International
economic law and the pursuit of human rights: a framework for discussion of the legality of 'selective
purchasing' laws under the WTO Government Procurement Agreement', (1999) 2(1) Journal of
International Economic Law 3; S. Bal, 'International Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights:
Reinterpreting Article XX of the GATT', (2001) 10(1) Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 62; L. Bartels,
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impacts of international trade.14 While these subjects retain their place in the
contemporary literature, the debate has significantly expanded, and they occupy a far less
central position. An early addition was intellectual property, as human rights language
was heavily deployed in the ‘TRIPs and public health’ debate.15 More recently, a great
deal of work in the trade and human rights field centres on questions of development:
whether and how international trade regimes disadvantages developing countries and
(certain sections of) their populations. Another recent focus has been on concerns which
have been raised about the potential constraining impact of international trading system
'Article XX of GATT and the Problem of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction The Case of Trade Measures for the
Protection of Human Rights', (2002) 36(2) Journal of World Trade 353; S.H. Cleveland, 'Human Rights
Sanctions and International Trade: A Theory of Compatibility', (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic
Law 133.
14
The question of the effects of trade on employment and working conditions is invariably a part of
virtually all general commentaries on the relationship between trade and human rights: S. Wright, 'Women
and the Global Economic Order: A Feminist Perspective', (1995) 10(2) American University Journal of
International Law and Policy 861; L.A. Compa and S.F. Diamond, Human rights, labor rights, and
international trade (1996); R. Howse, 'The World Trade Organization and the protection of workers'
rights', (1999) 3(1) Journal of Small and Emerging Business Law 131; A. Taylor and C. Thomas, Global
trade and global social issues (1999); R. Howse and M. Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global
Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organisation, International Centre for Human Rights and
Democratic Development (2000); A.E.-S. Tay, 'The New Century, Globalisation and Human Rights',
(2000) 8(2) Asia Pacific Law Review 139; M. Cohn, 'The World Trade Organization: Elevating Property
Interests above Human Rights', (2001) 29(3) Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 427;
H. Lim, 'Trade and Human Rights - What's at Issue?' (2001) 35(2) Journal of World Trade 275; A. Brysk,
Globalization and human rights (2002); D. Shelton, 'Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World',
(2002) 25(2) Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 273; R. Wai, 'Countering,
Branding, Dealing: Using Economic and Social Rights in and around the International Trade Regime',
(2003) 14(1) European Journal of International Law 35 There are those, it should be noted, who do not
think that labour rights issues are properly part of a human rights agenda.
15
See OHCHR, ‘The impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on
human rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13, 27 June 2001; the report of the Sub-Commission’s Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Health, eg, ‘The right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health - Mission to the World Trade Organization’,
E/CN.4/2004/49/Add.1, 1 March 2004; A.R. Chapman, 'The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual
Property Protection', (2002) 5 Journal of International Economic Law 861; C. Dommen, 'Raising Human
Rights Concerns in the World Trade Organization: Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies', (2002) 24(1)
Human Rights Quarterly 1; E.M. Fox, 'Globalization and Human Rights: Looking out for the Welfare of
the Worst Off', (2002) 35(1) New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 201; R. Wai,
'Countering, Branding, Dealing: Using Economic and Social Rights in and around the International Trade
Regime', (2003) 14(1) European Journal of International Law 35; L.R. Helfer, 'Mediating Interactions in
an Expanding International Intellectual Property Regime', (2004) 36 Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law 123; L.R. Helfer, 'Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking', (2004) 29(1) Yale Journal of International Law 1; F.
Abbott, 'The 'Rule of Reason' and the Right to Health: Integrating Human Rights and Competition
Principles in the context of TRIPS' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and
International Trade (2005), 279; J. Crook, 'Balancing Intellectual Property Protection with the Human
Right to Health', (2005) 23 Berkeley Journal of International Law 524; F. Abbott, 'TRIPS and Human
Rights: Preliminary Reflections' in F.M. Abbott, C. Breining-Kaufman and T. Cottier (eds.), International
Trade and Human Rights: Foundations and Conceptual Issues (2006), 145.
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on what has been termed ‘social regulation’ – that is, health and safety regulation,
consumer protection regimes, equal opportunity legislation, labour market regulation,
among others, all of which are seen as tools for the protection of human rights.16 From
around 2000 or 2001, the debate has also encompassed questions concerning the impact
of services liberalization on the provision of essential services to the poor.17
How, then, does this article fit into that literature? As already stated in the opening
paragraph, I bring to bear two core critiques of the trade and human rights debate as a
whole, which correspond to Parts 2 and 3 of this article. In Part 2, I look at what has been
said about the impact of the trade regime on the enjoyment of human rights. In most of
this literature, the trade regime is understood as primarily a system of formal rules and
associated enforcement machinery. For most commentators, we know the ‘human rights
impact’ of the trade regime by analysing how these formal legal obligations constrain
governments’ ability to take measures to protect human rights. Inevitably, this analysis
has produced a narrow reformative agenda – one which concentrates on formal
amendment to WTO rules (and rule-making processes), and which moreover focusses
largely on relaxing the obligations imposed by them, creating greater ‘policy space’ for
WTO Members. In my view, formal analysis of WTO rules yields a highly incomplete
16

Discussions of these and other regulatory issues can be found in: A. Orford, 'Contesting Globalization: A
Feminist Perspective on the Future of Human Rights', (1998) 8(2) Transnational Law and Contemporary
Problems 171; S. Charnovitz, 'The Global Market as Friend or Foe of Human Rights', (1999) 25(1)
Brooklyn Journal of International Law 113; R. Howse and M. Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global
Economy: Challenges for the World Trade Organisation, International Centre for Human Rights and
Democratic Development (2000); J.T. Gathii, 'Re-Characterizing the Social in the Constitutionalization of
the WTO: A Preliminary Analysis', (2001) 7 Widener Law Symposium Journal 137; T. Cottier, 'Trade and
Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover', (2002) 5(1) Journal of International Economic Law 111; C.
Dommen, 'Raising Human Rights Concerns in the World Trade Organization: Actors, Processes and
Possible Strategies', (2002) 24(1) Human Rights Quarterly 1; G. Marceau, 'WTO Dispute Settlement and
Human Rights', (2002) 13(4) European Journal of International Law 753, as well as OHCHR, ‘An
analytical study on the fundamental principle of non-discrimination in the context of globalization’,
E/CN.4/2004/40, 15 January 2004.
17
OHCHR, ‘Liberalization of trade in services and human rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002;
CIEL, Going with the Flow: How International Trade, Finance and Investment Regimes Affect the
Provision of Water to the Poor, Center for International Environmental Law (2003); CIEL, Water Traded:
A Center for International Environmental Law Issue Brief, Center for International Environmental Law
(2003); CIEL, GATS and Water: Retaining Policy Space to Serve the Poor, Center for International
Environmental Law (2003); A. Ostrovksy, R. Speed and E. Tuerk, GATS, Water and the Environment:
Implications of the General Agreement on Trade in Services for Water Resources, World Wildlife Fund for
Nature (2003); A. Lang, 'The GATS and Regulatory Autonomy: A Case Study of Social Regulation of the
Water Industry', (2004) 7(4) Journal of International Economic Law 801.
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and in many respects misleading picture of the impact of the trade regime. This is partly
because such analysis tends to overestimate the coercive impact of WTO rules on reallife regulatory processes. It is also because formal legal analysis fails to capture other,
arguably more important, ways in which the WTO system shapes global trade policies,
through processes of persuasion, socialization, and knowledge production. Furthermore,
such analyses focus solely on the direct constraining effect of the WTO legal system, and
are blind to the indirect, context-dependent and often contradictory deeper social
transformations to which that system gives rise. I argue therefore for the need to build a
richer and more complex picture of the impacts of the WTO system on human rights
protection. This is important not just because all aspects of the WTO ought to be subject
to critical scrutiny. More importantly, it is because attention to the myriad processes
through which the trade regime makes its influence felt, enables us to see how the trade
regime can most productively help us collectively to re-imagine and re-create a better
international trading order.
In Part 3, my focus shifts from the trade regime to the human rights regime. In particular,
I am interested in exploring what the engagement of human rights actors and languages
has brought to debates about the international trading system. One of the primary
questions I address is how the engagement of ‘human rights’ has reshaped and
reconstituted debates about global economic governance. What productive function has it
performed in these debates, and how (if at all) has it helped to progress them? What do
human rights actors, as human rights actors, have to offer debates about the nature and
future of the global trading order? In my view, the literature so far has been seriously
hampered by the lack of coherent and clearly articulated answers to these questions. I
argue that the present trade and human rights literature is implicitly structured by
primarily three different conceptions of what human rights can offer. Human rights may
be understood as: a set of rules providing substantive guidance to trade policy-makers
and defining the parameters of acceptable trade policy; a set of political technologies
which can be deployed to achieve particular trade policy outcomes; or a set of social
objectives and values which at times run counter to the liberal trade project, and therefore
necessitate decisions about complex policy trade-offs. I show how these conceptions have
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led commentators down some initially promising but in my view ultimately unsatisfying
paths. I then go on offer two other models which may lead in more promising directions:
I suggest first that human rights may be best understood less a source of substantive
policy prescriptions and more as a trigger for policy learning; and second that human
rights provide a means of challenging the norms of technical rationality which presently
legitimate and structure the trade regime.
It will be clear already that my intervention into this debate looks somewhat different
from most, and for that reason it may be necessary to prepare the reader in advance for
what to expect. For one thing, unlike many commentators, I do not attempt to take a
position on the contested question of whether and how ‘trade liberalization’ undermines
or enhances ‘the enjoyment of human rights’. Indeed, for the purposes of this article, I
remain explicitly agnostic about the substantive critiques and defences which have been
made of the trade regime from a human rights perspective. On such questions, the
underlying normative commitment of my article is a thin one: it takes for granted that the
critiques of the trade regime raise important issues; it proceeds from the presumption that
the most fundamental issues they raise can never be finally settled; and it acknowledges
the possibility that profound transformation in the trading order may be necessary to
adequately respond to them. My primary concern is with the trade and human rights
debate itself – specifically, whether and to what extent it enables or forecloses
transformative change, whether and to what extent it maintains its ‘critical bite’.
Furthermore, my account differs from those which take for granted that human rights
represent a presumptively legitimate and appropriate standpoint from which to address
trade issues. Of course, I find it perfectly natural that human rights bodies have taken an
interest in trade issues, and I do not think it is necessary to justify that interest by asking
what human rights bring to the debate. But I do think it is important to determine
precisely what are the effects of the engagement of human rights is in the debate, and to
think critically about the relative strengths and weaknesses of that engagement. And
finally, I do not seek, as many others do, to map the relationship between trade and
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human rights.18 This is partly because such exercises too often produce little more than
marginally useful generalities. But more importantly, as explained further below,19 I am
sceptical of that very project. The reality is that – now more than ever – the relationship
between the two regimes is constantly evolving. I am less interested in what that
relationship is than in the processes through which it is constantly becoming. Indeed,
what I am most interested in are the ways that the trade and human rights debate itself is
part of the processes by which that relationship is being socially reconstructed.

2.

THE WTO AS CONSTRAINT: LEGAL CENTRALISM IN THE TRADE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS DEBATE

Let me turn first of all to a question which has been a central focus of much of the work
in the trade and human rights debate – namely, the impact of the international trading
system on the promotion and protection of human rights. At the outset, a distinction
should be drawn between accounts of the social impacts of international trade itself, and
analyses of the impact of the international trade regime on the policies and policy-making
processes of its Members. The criticisms I advance in this section apply only to the latter.
In fact, it is worth taking a moment to note that the literature relating to the former
question is typically highly sophisticated, and exhibits many of the features which I will
be arguing are lacking in relation to work on the political impact of the trade regime.
During the 1990s, when the trade and human rights debate was just beginning, discussion
of the impact of trade liberalization on human rights arose in the context of a broader
interest in the social impact of what is often referred to as ‘economic globalization’.
Many accounts during this time drew heavily on contemporary scholarship on
globalization – much of which was at pains to note the complexity, multi-dimensionality,
multi-directionality, unpredictability and context-dependence of the effects of
18

For a classic and sophisticated example, see T. Cottier, 'Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to
Discover', (2002) 5(1) Journal of International Economic Law 111.
19
See below, Section 3 of Part 3.
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globalization.20 These lessons seem to have deeply influenced many commentators
writing on trade liberalization and its effects on the enjoyment of human rights. Work
within the trade and human rights literature has, for example, consistently demonstrated
that the outcomes of international trade vary across time and place, and depend heavily
on all aspects of the social, political, ideological, regulatory, cultural and economic
context in which it takes place.21 Human rights scholars in particular have demonstrated a
reluctance to generalize about the impacts of trade liberalization, preferring the claim that
liberalization may – but need not – lead to improved living conditions.22 No doubt in part
because these scholars saw their arguments as a corrective to some of the more
Panglossian and overstated promises made about the benefits of liberal trade, they were
less likely to make the same mistakes themselves. Moreover, the trade and human rights
literature has also been noteworthy for the ways in which it has clarified the huge variety
of different indirect pathways by which trade flows can affect social outcomes, as well as
drawn attention to the complex mutual interactions between trade liberalization other
socioeconomic trends such as the increasing concentration of capital, the growth of
transnational enterprises, new waves of migration, and so on. Furthermore, this literature
has played an important part in sensitizing us to the multidimensionality of trade’s
impact. It has done this in part by focussing our attention not simply on traditional topics
such as the effects of trade on growth, income and employment, but also on impacts on
such factors as human health, equality and discrimination, and access to food, particularly
of vulnerable groups.
In my view, the question of the impact of the international trade regime – that is, the
question of how the international trade regime influences the character, dynamics and
operation of the international trading system – raises similar issues. That is to say, it is

20

Classic texts with the body of scholarship I am talking about include: P.Q. Hirst and G. Thompson,
Globalization in question: the international economy and the possibilities of governance (1999); J.A.
Scholte, Globalization: a critical introduction (2000); D. Held and A.G. McGrew, Governing
globalization: power, authority, and global governance (2002); D. Held and A.G. McGrew, The global
transformations reader: an introduction to the globalization debate (2003).
21
It is interesting to note in this regard that by and large the preferred methodology on the question of
trade’s impacts has been the case study, an analytical form which is well suited to understanding and
evaluating the specific dynamics of trade liberalization in particular contexts.
22
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complicated in a similar way by multi-dimensional, multi-modal, context-dependent and
interactive effects. However, the literature on this question demonstrates little awareness
of these complications. Instead, it tends to adopt a oversimplified framework in which the
international trade regime (which in this context is the same as the WTO) acts primarily
as an external constraint on its Members’ behaviour, by imposing a set of powerful,
binding and enforceable legal obligations, requiring states to adopt certain kinds of
policies, and refrain from adopting others. Within this framework, we know the impact of
the trade regime primarily by looking at the rules it establishes, and the ways these rules
are interpreted and applied.
The framework I describe here has much in common with what Wolfe has described as a
tendency towards ‘legal centralism’ in discussion of the international trade regime.23
Drawing on Wolfe’s work, we can break it down into at least four more specific
premises. One is that the WTO is essentially a rule-making institution, and that any
influence that the WTO wields is primarily felt through the direct constraining effects of
those rules. A second is that the nature and content of those rules can be ascertained most
reliably and authoritatively by looking at the texts of WTO agreements, as well as the
interpretation of those agreements through the decisions of Panels and the Appellate
Body. A third concerns the centrality of the WTO. In part because of its hierarchical
superiority in the (international) legal order, the WTO – and more specifically the rules it
promulgates – are seen to play a uniquely central and powerful role in defining the nature
of the trading order, and determining the conduct of participants within it. WTO rules, in
other words, are presumptively thought to be more significant than other sources of
normativity. The final premise is that the magnitude of the impact of WTO rules is
determined, most significantly, by their precision and by the availability of effective
mechanisms of coercive enforcement. This is because precision is vital if rules are to
23

R. Wolfe, 'See You in Geneva? Legal (Mis)Representations of the Trading System', (2005) 11 European
Journal of International Relations 339. The term ‘legal centralism’ is chosen by Wolfe in part because his
critique draws much from the tradition of legal pluralist thought. My critique differs somewhat, in that it
has its origins in a critique of the limitations of rational choice approaches to the study of institutions, so
perhaps the term ‘legal centralism’ is less appropriate in the present context. See also M. Finnemore and
S.J. Toope, 'Alternatives to "Legalization": Richer Views of Law and Politics', (2001) 55(3) International
Organization 743 for another account which sees rational choice perspectives on institutions and positivist
understandings of law as closely related, and often associated.
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provide meaningful guides for actor behaviour, and enforcement is crucial to ensuring
that the strategic costs and benefits associated with particular course of action are
significantly modified.
While they almost always remain implicit, it is not hard to see the ways in which these
premises strongly influence the trade and human rights debate, and the guide the
arguments deployed in it. Most commentators, for example, proceed as if we know the
‘human rights impact’ of the trade regime by analyzing its rules. Simplified, the typical
line of argument is in two stages: first, commentators typically scrutinize WTO
agreements carefully to determine the kinds of policy choices these agreements may
require or proscribe, and second, these policy choices are themselves carefully analyzed
to determine whether and in what ways they may respectively undermine or enhance the
enjoyment of human rights in particular circumstances. For example, initially in response
to the EC – Hormones dispute24, some commentators have expressed concern that certain
provisions of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS Agreement) may undermine the ability of Members to put in place adequate food
safety regimes in respect of new and potentially dangerous foods – and that such regimes
often play an important part in promoting and protecting the right to health.25 Another
very familiar example is the concern that TRIPs article 31(f) may limit the import and
export of generic drugs – a measure which, again, might be necessary in the fight against
particular health epidemics, and thus the promotion of the right to health.26 A third is
work on the impacts of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA): concern has been expressed
that this agreements limits the circumstances in which many developing countries can put
in place protective measures such as tariffs, subsidies and safeguards mechanisms, which
may in some circumstances be the only effective means of protecting vulnerable

24

EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) – Complaint by the United States,
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, DSR 1998:I, 135, Panel Report, WT/DS26/R/USA, DSR 1998:III, 699,
adopted 13 February 1998.
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Eg, A. Orford, 'Contesting Globalization: A Feminist Perspective on the Future of Human Rights', (1998)
8(2) Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems 171; C. Dommen, 'Raising Human Rights Concerns
in the World Trade Organization: Actors, Processes and Possible Strategies', (2002) 24(1) Human Rights
Quarterly 1; G. Marceau, 'WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights', (2002) 13(4) European Journal of
International Law 753.
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See above n15.
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communities from the dislocations caused by agricultural import liberalization.27 The
point is that investigations into the influence and impact of the trade regime on human
rights focus primarily (often exclusively) on the degree of constraint its laws impose on
the policy choices of its Member states, so that assessing its impact becomes first and
foremost a formal legal question. In such analyses, the technical details of WTO
agreements take on paramount importance, and the pronouncements of the Appellate
Body in high profile cases are carefully scrutinized for their implications for Members’
policy autonomy. Typically, the analysis ends at this point: once textual inadequacy or
ambiguity is identified, there is usually little attempt to investigate the real-world impacts
of those texts on regulatory choices and decision-making processes.
The legal centralist framework, and the forms of analysis and critique to which it gives
rise, have achieved a kind of commonsense status in discussions of the impact of the
trade regime. In many respects this is for good reason: my claim is not that this
framework is wrong in any simple way, rather that it is seriously incomplete, and that on
its own it generates a potentially misleading map of the impacts of the trade regime. In
what follows, I set out four different dimensions for which this framework fails
adequately to account, and then go on to explain why these inadequacies matter so much.
1.

The salience and centrality of WTO law

My first concern is related to the normative centrality or ‘salience’ of WTO obligations –
that is, the extent to which WTO obligations are central or peripheral in policy-making
processes, and the degree of importance which national policy-makers place on them in
practice. The legal centralist framework encourages us to think of WTO obligations as
enjoying a high degree of salience, certainly compared to other international legal
27

See, for example, C. Breining-Kaufman, 'The Right to Food and Trade in Agriculture' in T. Cottier, E.
Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 341; OHCHR, ‘Globalization
and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights’, E/CN.4/2002/54, 15 January 2002; Simons, “Human
Security, Corporate Accountability and the Regulation of International Trade”, CCHS Human Security
Fellowship Working Paper, March 2004; C.G. Gonzalez, 'Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO
Agreement on Agriculture, Food Security, and Developing Countries', (2002) 27(2) Columbia Journal of
Environmental Law 433 M. Ritchie and K. Dawkins, 'WTO Food and Agricultural Rules: Sustainable
Agriculture and the Human Right to Food', (2000) 9(1) Minnesota Journal of Global Trade 9.
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obligations. Primarily, of course, this is because of the WTO’s dispute settlement
mechanism, and in particular the existence of a credible threat of sanctions for noncompliance. It is also because of the relative precision of many WTO obligations (which
in principle augments their capacity to act as a guide to behaviour), as well as their
hierarchical superiority (which tends generate a perception of salience as compared to say
domestic sources of legal normativity). Furthermore, the present high levels of
compliance with formal WTO dispute settlement rulings is often treated as sufficient
empirical evidence of the strong coercive force of WTO obligations.28
But while these indications are clearly significant, they tell only part of the story. They
must be balanced against a variety of other factors, which give us good reason to suspect
that WTO legal constraints are not in all circumstances as central to national policymaking processes as is often assumed. For instance, it is important to remember that high
levels of compliance with dispute settlement rulings provide direct evidence only of
levels of post-dispute compliance. This kind of evidence tells us little if anything about
the extent to which WTO law influences day-to-day regulatory decision-making, in those
vast majority of cases which never reach dispute settlement.29 In such cases, whether
WTO obligations are central or only peripheral in decision-making processes depends on
much more than their precision and the existence of a credible threat of sanctions. Their
practical impact depends, for example, on a high degree of awareness of relevant WTO
provisions amongst national governmental decision-makers, as well as on the existence of
routinized and systematic practices of WTO compliance review as a standard part of
regulatory decision-making. We have surprisingly little empirical evidence on the extent
to which WTO obligations are systematically considered in domestic legal processes in
this way. At the very least, however, we would expect this to vary considerably from
country to country, and from issue area to issue area – depending on the resources and
administrative capacity of domestic governments, the availability of local officials with
relevant WTO expertise, previous dealings between particular government departments
28

For a selection of the literature on compliance with the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, see (2002)
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and the WTO legal system.30 Many countries, it seems, find it more efficient to rely on
post hoc complaints by trading partners and exporters as the most efficient method of
ensuring acceptable levels of compliance with WTO law.31
Moreover, it has long been recognised that compliance with legal rules depends not
solely on the existence of a sanctioning mechanism, but also to a significant extent on
their congruence with pre-existing value commitments in the regulated polity.32 It may be
argued that the great lesson of 60 years of experience with international trade law is that
such law cannot be effective in the long run in the absence of a broad and lasting
consensus that its strictures are necessary and mutually beneficial.33 There is no doubt
that at some level this consensus currently exists, but few would claim that it is equally
strong in all circumstances. Even at the level of individual governmental agencies, WTO
law represents only one of many normative claims to which regulatory decision-makers
are subject. Even apart from their embeddedness in local political cultures, domestic
regulatory authorities are also influenced by very strong organizational cultures,
including powerful social norms concerning the kinds of policy choices which are
legitimate, desirable and politically possible. Where WTO norms are not internalized into
that culture, even the hardest of coercive legal mechanisms can be relatively ineffective
in fundamentally altering the form and content of policy-making processes. Indeed, a
number of incidents in the history of GATT/WTO dispute settlement illustrate this
30

Anecdotal evidence, from interviews with the legal departments in the governments of a variety of WTO
Members, suggests the (unsurprising) conclusion that the experience of being the subject of WTO
proceedings in a particular regulatory sub-field (be it quarantine, or environmental measures), has the effect
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future decision-making processes.
31
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general effect well.34 Furthermore, as many have noted in other contexts, precisely the act
of making the GATT/WTO legal system ‘harder’ – that is to say, made more legally
precise, subject to binding and coercive dispute resolution, and so on – may in some
circumstances actually undermine the normative cohesion on which its effectiveness is
(partially) based. Finnemore and Toope, for example, note that judicialization may lead
to reduced levels of adherence to the ‘spirit’ of the law, in part by encouraging aggressive
legal argumentative strategies, and fostering an environment in which compliance with
legal formalities is understood as all that is required.35
Even to the extent that we acknowledge the importance of the coercive machinery of the
WTO dispute settlement system in ensuring the effectiveness of WTO obligations – and
of course to a certain extent we must – we should still be careful not to over-generalize
the contexts in which WTO law plays a central role. In many circumstances, threats of
trade sanctions for non-compliance can be less that perfectly credible or immediate, and
therefore less effective. For example, a decision-maker wishing to enact a potentially
WTO-inconsistent measure may find the threat of WTO action less compelling in the
absence of a relatively substantial trade impact of the measure in question, a relatively
powerful export lobby in the complaining country (which is both sensitized to the
possibility of WTO proceedings and has the resources and political capital to press for
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them), and of sufficient levels of trade flows between the two relevant countries for the
threat of sanctions to ‘bite’.
What I have been calling the salience of WTO obligations also depends in practice on
what these obligations actually require – that is, the extent to which they actually do
impose genuinely burdensome obligations on national decision-makers, which require
them to take substantively different decisions from those which they might otherwise
prefer. This is largely an interpretive or doctrinal question and clearly one which cannot
be answered adequately without detailed consideration of specific legal issues. Much
depends on the particular provision and the specific circumstances at issue in any
particular context, as well as on the perceptions of the individual commentator.
Nevertheless, it is worth making the generally under-emphasized observation that
obligations in WTO agreements are often ambiguously worded, or impose procedural
rather than substantive requirements, or are hedged around by a variety of overlapping
safeguards, exemptions and flexibilities.36 Taken together, these features are often more
productive of confusion and uncertainty than precision – they look more like flexibility
rather than constraint – and in fact make a variety of legal strategies available to
determined regulators wishing to pursue a path of action in apparent defiance of WTO
requirements. Of course, this is less true in some areas than in others. Some disciplines
are indeed extremely precise and difficult to legitimately work around, tariff bindings
being perhaps the obvious example. But in my view the existence of significant flexibility
is particularly apparent in relation to constraints on those areas of policy-making – such
as regulation concerning food safety, consumer protection, environmental protection,
among other matters – which tend at present to concern human rights scholars and
commentators the most.
Finally, it is important to be realistic about the relative centrality of formal WTO
obligations as determinants of trade policy, and more generally as determinants of the
character of the international trading system. The imperatives of WTO law, of course, are
36
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only some among a very large number of pressures facing regulatory authorities – indeed,
only some among a diversity of legal pressures facing them.37 Structural and other factors
driving trade liberalization may in the end be much more important than WTO
obligations in driving trade liberalization.38 It is certainly arguable that recent periods of
dramatic liberalization in international trade (structural adjustment in developing
countries during the 1970s and 80s being an obvious example) have had little to do with
legal obligations imposed by the international trade regime, at least not directly. We may
also legitimately wonder how big a difference increasing the formal flexibilities provided
to developing countries under WTO agreements may actually make – it is interesting how
often trade commentators find themselves arguing that countries ought to us existing
flexibilities in WTO agreements more than they currently do.39 It is hard to resist the
impression that (at least in an significant proportion of cases) the importance of WTO
obligations can be somewhat marginal to the decisions of trade policy-makers. Of course,
I don’t wish to stretch the point: my claim is not, of course, that WTO obligations are
unimportant. It is merely to correct what I see as a tendency to over-emphasize the
determinative role of these obligations on trade policy.
2.

The multiple modalities of WTO effects

If in the previous section I argued that the legal centralist frame tends to overestimate the
constraining impact of WTO law, in this section my claim is that it underestimates or
overlooks a variety of other important mechanisms by which the international trade
37
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regime makes its influence felt. There is a large and growing body of literature – much of
it informed by strands of constructivist thinking and drawing on traditions within
sociological enquiry – attempting both to theorize and empirically map the various noncompulsory40 modes of influence and power which international organizations wield.41
Within this literature, international institutions like the WTO are understood not so much
as exogenous constraints on state behaviour, but rather as social environments in which
states (or the individuals who represent them) come to redefine, reformulate and reconceive the kinds of trade policies they wish to pursue. There are at least three relevant
lines of enquiry which this literature pursues.
First of all, we can think of international organizations as technologies for the production,
authorization and dissemination of policy norms. This is a conceptual model which has
been developed primarily in studies of international institutions working in the fields of
development and human rights, among others.42 A number of scholars have argued, in
fact, that normative diffusion represents the primary function of many international
institutions, and the most powerful mechanism at their disposal to influence the
behaviour of states.43 There is a sophisticated literature on the various microprocesses by
which this kind of normative diffusion takes place. Some commentators concentrate on
the role of persuasion, argumentation and conscious deliberation. They see international
institutions as forums for the engagement of these deliberative processes, where state
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representatives are prompted to ‘think harder’ about issues in light of persuasive
evidence, and over time come to change their mind to accord more closely to the
dominant normative framework favoured by the international institution in question.44
Others focus more on acculturation – that is, the often tacit processes by which members
of a organization come to share its normative commitments. Within international
organizations, these commentators note, psycho-social pressures to conform arise from
processes of identification, shaming, back-patting, status maximization, habituation, and
so on.45 And others still concentrate on the discursive practices by which norms are
propagated, communicated and valorized within international organizations. They show
how the distinctive conceptual frameworks, modes of speaking, and forms of argument
characteristic of particular international regimes can construct particular policy
orientations as appropriate, rational, modern, legitimate, and so on.46 These three
processes – persuasion, acculturation and discursive legitimation – can act directly by
affecting those policy-makers who are themselves active participants in a regime, as well
as indirectly by working on special interest groups who, in turn, persuade domestic
audiences and political leaders.47
Although to date there is still little empirical work on these processes, there are strong
reasons to think that they play an important role within the present international trade
regime. Through many of its institutional practices, the WTO tends to teach states about
the kinds of trade policies which are desirable and in their best interests, even if the trade
44
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policy obligations imposed by WTO law do not correspond precisely with this ideal.
There are, for example, a number of venues within the current WTO system which we
might expect to function as sites of normative socialization: accession negotiations teach
new Members what it means to be a modern liberal trading nation; the Trade Policy
Review Mechanism helps to produce and disseminate norms concerning the proper shape
and objectives of domestic economic policy; while technical assistance programs are (or
at least have the potential to be) the mechanism by which government leaders are taught
norms of appropriate trade policy behaviour.48 Furthermore, there are indications that
socialization and persuasion historically played an important role in producing outcomes
in the GATT system. A number of commentators have noted that, at least in its first few
decades, one of the primary achievements of the GATT system was the creation of a
close-knit community of trade experts and policy-makers. Through regular interaction,
these players developed strong bonds of trust as well as shared cognitive frameworks,
normative commitments, internalized social roles and expectations, and habits of thought,
all of which contributed to the maintenance of a stable elite preference for trade
liberalization.49 This social network, it is argued, was a primary factor in creating and
maintaining a generalized and long-term commitment to liberal trade among policymakers in the post-war political order. While the nature, size, intensity and orientation of
transnational policy networks in the field of international trade have of course changed
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since that time, there is every reason to assume that the role of the WTO in creating and
shaping such networks is equally significant today.
One important aside: I should not be misunderstood as suggesting that the international
trading system is always or necessarily associated with the global projection of a
particular economic ideology. I have argued elsewhere that literature on the trade regime
is too often characterized by an uncritical assumption that the normative framework of
the regime is naturally associated with economic neoliberalism, or with radical free
market fundamentalism.50 Historical scholarship reminds us that the values and norms
disseminated through the international trade regime are fluctuating and contingent. In
fact, the post-war regime began very far from free market fundamentalism, has been
associated with a variety of political and normative programs since, and has always been
characterized by a degree of contestation and internal contradiction.51 Research into
mechanisms of persuasion and socialization within the WTO, while in my view vital,
needs therefore to be undertaken carefully, so as to make no assumptions about the
character, durability and orientation of its normative influence.
Secondly, other scholars have focussed on the role of international institutions in the
production and dissemination of socially sanctioned knowledge about the world. This
‘knowledge-production function’ of international institutions has been conceptualized
and described in different ways by different commentators. One helpful model rests on a
linguistic analogy: international institutions are associated with particular languages (the
languages of human rights, development, trade, and so on) and are understood in their
character as discursive environments. These languages or discourses, it is said, provide
actors with a particular repertoire of categories and concepts with which to make sense of
the world. They are founded on, and express, particular theories about how the world
operates, and provide an interpretive framework through which we can access various
aspects of reality. This linguistic analogy allows us to understand a variety of often
50
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hidden ways in which international institutions wield power and influence social and
political outcomes. For example, Barnett and Finnemore describe international
organizations as exercising the power of classification and the power to fix meanings to
social phenomena.52 They note that, in various circumstances and for various purposes,
the World Bank defines people as peasants, day labourers, farmers, or others, and that
this classification has important consequences for whether these people are understood as
possessing the kinds of knowledge useful to guide the development process.53 Similarly,
they note (drawing on the work of Escobar54) that the World Bank is a key venue for the
authoritative definition of the notion of development. The power to define the social
meaning of development is crucial, they suggest, because it
determines not only what constitutes the activity (what development is) but also who (or
what) is considered powerful and privileged, that is, who gets to do the developing …
and who is the object of development.55

Similar observations can be made in respect of the WTO. The WTO’s power of
classification is perhaps illustrated through its ability to authoritatively label particular
governmental activity as an ‘intervention’ (or a ‘trade barrier’ or an ‘impediment to
trade’). Such a label matters, because it can act to mobilize constituencies for or against
the activity in question, as well as to frame debates about its desirability, and define the
range of permissible arguments in circulation in those debates. Moreover, the WTO acts
as is a venue in which the key terms of trade discourse are constructed, contested,
authorized and disseminated. It is a key site for the social construction of the meaning of
‘free trade’ – that is, the definition of the purpose and nature of the liberal trade project.
The importance of this is the same as in the case of development cited above: it helps to
determine what constitutes free trade, who gets to do it, and (indirectly) who benefits.
The WTO, in other words, can be understood as a mechanism for the social construction
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of the international trading order, for defining the categories through which actors
interpret the trading system and their place within it, or at least mediating struggles over
them. In this way, rather than simply constraining states’ behaviour, it enables (particular
kinds of) action, by providing a conceptual framework within which particular kinds of
actions are made meaningful.56 Another, less abstract model focusses on the ways in
which international institutions produce and disseminate technical knowledge about the
causal mechanisms which govern the operation of various aspects of international life.
International organizations might, most simply, be involved in the production of reports
and technical documents which explicitly develop causal models for guiding policy
development. They might also facilitate the creation of knowledge networks, mediating
the channels through which policy-makers are exposed to particular forms of expertise,
and regulating the form in which policy ideas are introduced to decision-makers.57 The
applicability of these insights to the WTO hardly needs explanation.
The third and final set of mechanisms are of a different kind, more familiar to mainstream
thinking about the role of international organizations in political life. In this story,
international organizations like the WTO shape political outcomes by influencing the
dynamics of domestic political debates about – in the case of the WTO – trade policy.
While this body of literature is like the previous two in that it is interested in the
processes by which state preferences are created and redefined, the focus here is less on
the cognitive microprocesses by which individuals come to an understanding of their
interests, and more on the social processes by which the (fixed) preferences of a
multitude of individuals are aggregated within a state polity.58
One way in which the WTO influences domestic political debates, for example, is by
changing the constellation of actors involved in them. Often it can have the effect of
expanding trade policy debates to include foreign actors. As Swenarchuk has noted, one
56
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practical effect of the national treatment obligation in WTO law – by which foreign
products are entitled to equivalent treatment to that granted to their domestic equivalents
– is to give foreign producers an interest in the governmental regulation of domestic
businesses.59 In some circumstances, the result has been direct lobbying by foreign
businesses in favour of policies of domestic liberalization.60 More directly, the WTO also
facilitates the input of foreign actors into domestic trade policy decision-making, by
opening up intergovernmental channels through which affected foreign businesses can
make their complaints heard, as well as by focussing international attention on obstacles
to trade in particular countries. Furthermore, the WTO can also lead to the formation of
new actors on the domestic political scene, by altering the political opportunity structure
facing various interest groups.61 For example, it was in significant part the expansion of
the WTO into the arena of services that lead to the creation of new service industry
coalitions and business networks loosely tied together by the new concept of ‘trade in
services’.62 While such groups are important actors within the trade regime itself, they
also are directly involved in domestic debates concerning liberalization policies relevant
to a variety of service industries. Finally, WTO processes might more indirectly lead to
changes in the range of actors involved in domestic political debates. For example, the
creation of domestic systems of IP protection, in compliance with international trade law,
may lead to the creation of new domestic constituencies in favour of further and more
extensive IP protection.63
Closely related are the processes by which the international trading system can help to
mobilize actors in favour of liberal trade, who might otherwise remain relatively
politically disengaged. Thus, for example, numerous commentators have noted that the
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reciprocal nature of international trade obligations – by making access to foreign markets
conditional on inward liberalization measures – can mobilize export-oriented domestic
producers in favour of domestic liberalization projects, and thus alleviate to some extent
the well-known public choice problem characteristic of domestic trade policy.64
Furthermore, periodic multilateral trade negotiations provide ongoing opportunities for
domestic policy elites to continuously revisit trade policy questions, and to re-energize
domestic pro-liberalization interest groups. (Interestingly, in direct contrast to widespread
perceptions, multilateral trade negotiations are only sometimes instigated and shaped by
already-mobilized industry groups. It is at least as common for governments to use such
negotiations as a means to galvanize such groups, and proactively ask for their input in
defining and supporting national trade policy priorities.65) Of course, these processes can
work in the other direction: Goldstein and Martin note, for example, the way in which the
ratification and incorporation of international trade agreements by domestic legislative
authorities can provide a focal point for those groups resistant to liberal trade agenda, and
in favour of more protectionist policies.66
Finally, the existence of the WTO and its legal system can alter the dynamics of domestic
trade debates by adding to the array of arguments that can legitimately be deployed in
such debates. Hudec has noted, for example, the way in which domestic policy-makers
can (whether or not there is strict legal justification) use the excuse of WTO obligations
to justify politically unpopular liberalization measures.67 In the United States for
example, as Destler has described, policy elites have been able to galvanize support for
specific liberalization initiatives by referring to the need to maintain American leadership
in international economic affairs, as well as to maintain the integrity and stability of the
international trading system more generally. He also describes the ways in which the
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international trading system has allowed American trade policy elites to respond to
domestic political pressures in new ways: for example, responding to widespread concern
about the US trade deficit by waging an aggressive campaign to open foreign markets,
rather than the more traditional response of raising barriers to imports.68
To summarize: the international trade regime does far more than simply place formal
legal obligations on trade policy-makers. It influences the constellation of actors involved
in policy-making processes, helps to establish the terms of their discussion, shapes their
understanding of the purpose of their endeavour and of the liberal trade project more
generally, helps to generate shared conceptions about the boundaries of acceptable and
legitimate trade policy, and provides sanctioned technical knowledge and cognitive tools
for the formulation of trade policy interests. Contrary to the implicit claims of legal
centralism, these processes are likely to be far more significant – if less visible – than
processes of legal compulsion.
3.

Multi-directionality and indirect impacts

A third criticism of the legal centralist frame is that it tends to focus our attention on the
direct and immediate impacts of WTO law in the context of individual disputes. We are
encouraged to understand the impact of WTO obligations solely in terms of the degree of
constraint they impose on, or freedom they provide to, domestic authorities. Significantly
less attention is paid, however, to the longer-term and more indirect social impacts of the
WTO legal system as its legal norms embed themselves into particular socio-political
contexts. Attention to these deeper effects yields a vastly richer and more complex
picture of the social effects of the WTO legal system: in which the impact of international
legal norms is acknowledged to be unpredictable and often unintended69, dynamic, highly
context-dependent, and multidirectional.
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Take the impact of the GATT/WTO system on patterns of protectionism. We are
accustomed to thinking of the GATT/WTO as constraining protectionism, putting in
place an expanding collection of prohibitive rules which gradually tend to eliminate
protectionist policies. And, of course, this is a large part of the story. But in addition to
these direct and most visible effects, the prohibitions set out in the GATT/WTO legal
framework have generated a variety of often surprising indirect effects, which have
ultimately played a crucial role in shaping the contemporary international trading order.
For example, while the GATT/WTO system has certainly reduced the incidence of
protectionist policies, it has also tended to shift the focus of protectionist efforts onto
those measures which remain permissible under that law. Thus Hughes and Waelbroeck
tell the story of the a simultaneous decrease in tariff restrictions and an increased use of
export subsidies and production subsidies during the 1960s and 1970s, both by
industrialized country governments, and (partly as a consequence) by the developing
country counterparts.70 This reconfiguration of the instruments of trade policy, they
argue, in some cases served to entrench and even facilitate protectionist pressures,
primarily because it provided new – often less transparent and less easily reversible –
avenues for the expression of these pressures. In fact, one can plausibly tell the story of
the postwar trading system as a complex game, in which Members agreed to certain
restrictions on their trade policy options – while leaving certain other options
conspicuously open – then over time developed new strategies for responding to
protectionist pressures while still remaining (more or less71) within the boundaries
imposed by the GATT/WTO, which in turn prompted further periodic revision of the
rules in response to these broad reconfigurations of trade policy tools.72 From this
perspective, mapping the effects of the GATT/WTO system is not just a question of the
extent to which it has been effective in reducing trade barriers, but also a question of how
it has helped to restructure and reorganize protectionist pressures. It is a system which,
even as it has helped to exclude protectionist pressures from particular loci of trade
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policy-making, has actually in practice facilitated the insertion of protectionist forces into
others.73 The point of this is a general one: the story of the impacts of the GATT regime
on the political economy of protectionism is much more complex and multi-layered than
a typical analysis of the GATT texts would suggest. It raises the possibility – indeed the
near certainty – that these impacts will look fundamentally different in different social
and political contexts, and even have diametrically opposed results across different
countries.
A similarly complex and contradictory story can be sketched out in respect of the impact
of the WTO system on democratic control of trade policy decisions. Because we focus on
the direct and immediate impacts of WTO obligations, and think of them in terms of
constraints and prohibitions on policy choices, it is customary to understand the WTO as
reducing the democratic controls of national polities over the trade policies that their
governments pursue. The line of cases in which the WTO dispute settlement system has
purported to decide the permissibility under WTO law of particular national health- and
environment-related regulatory measures has been the subject of a great deal of critique
along these lines.74 Of course there is a degree of truth to this claim, but again it tells only
part of the story. It is also true that this line of cases has – inadvertently and unpredictably
– given rise to an unprecedented level of public scrutiny of WTO decisions, and has
facilitated the engagement of a huge variety of social actors into trade policy debates. It is
clear that, partly as a response to the perceived excesses of WTO law, the degree of
public interest in, levels of information on, and general engagement with international
economic issues, has significantly increased. Similarly, at a more specific level, the
73
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reference in the SPS agreement to standards developed by some international standardssetting bodies75 has given rise to critiques concerning the rising influence of relatively
non-transparent and unaccountable international administrative bodies. But these very
critiques have actually led to some institutional changes in these bodies, in the direction
of greater democratization.76 This point is not a complex one, and has been made before
in the context of studies of globalization77: it is simply that, like most processes
associated with globalization, trade liberalization and institutions of trade governance
tend to generate their own resistance, and their own counter-pressures. Whether these
counterforces actually overpower those primary institutional influences, and the ways in
which the two contradictory impulses interact, is in all cases an empirical question, the
answer to which cannot be presumed, or determined in advance.
A particular tendency of the legal centralist frame is to encourage to focus on the
harmonizing or homogenizing impulse of the international trade regime. Put simply: to
the extent that its Members are subject to the same constraints, and are forced to abide by
the same rules, we might expect the trade regime to produce a degree of uniformity of
trade policy choices across its membership. But once we pay closer attention to the
indirect social effects of WTO rules, it becomes apparent that even uniform rules can be
productive of diversity and variation.78 An interesting example is provided by the
provisions of the SPS agreement mentioned above, which deal with the use of
international standards and with the scientific basis for SPS measures. These provisions
are typically understood as embedding a tendency towards regulatory harmonization into
the agreement, as well as a tendency towards the reduction of regulatory diversity across
Member states. To a large extent this is unsurprising: the presumption that SPS measures
in conformity with international standards comply with the SPS agreement clearly
75
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encourages harmonization to some extent, while the science-based disciplines raise at
least the possibility of regulatory convergence to the extent that scientific knowledge
becomes more unified (on any particular question) over time. But, as Atik has
perceptively noted, over the longer term, precisely the opposite is also perfectly
plausible.79 Since the science on which SPS measures are based typically deals with
questions of immense complexity, it can have a tendency towards variegation over time
and in different contexts. This tendency may, Atik suggests, be reinforced by the SPS
agreement itself, which by its operation encourages the multiplication of scientific
agencies with input into the regulatory processes of WTO Members, and thus the
multiplication of distinct scientific communities and scientific knowledges. This in turn
can lead to greater regulatory diversity:
As scientific activity is dispersed across a greater number of societies, a multiplicity of
scientific views can be expected. More and more regulatory positions will be defensible
by colourable claims of a scientific basis.80

Of course, such indirect long-term effects are still speculative. The precise manner in
which the SPS agreement interacts with and helps to reconstitute the geography of
scientific knowledge is, again, an empirical question, even if it is one that is not amenable
to easy measurement. It will depend, for example, on the extent to which the production
of the relevant scientific knowledge remains centralized, and the precise mechanisms by
which such knowledge is transmitted globally and reformulated in local contexts. The
point is that it is not possible to say definitively in advance to what extent and in what
circumstances the SPS agreement encourages regulatory convergence or regulatory
diversity – and, more importantly, that studying the SPS text, and the decisions of the
Appellate Body which deal with that text, can of necessity yield only a small and partial
insight into that question.

79

J. Atik, 'Science and International Regulatory Convergence', (1997) 17(2/3) Northwestern Journal of
International Law and Business 736.
80
Ibid., 750.

34

4.

Sources and nature of WTO normativity

This fourth and final criticism is that the legal centralist frame can give a misleading
impression of the impact of the WTO because it focusses attention on the formal sources
of WTO law – texts of the agreements and dispute settlement reports – to the exclusion of
a wide variety of informal or semi-formal norms and norm-generating processes which
also form part of the broader WTO legal system. Before the creation of the WTO in 1995,
observers of the international trade regime were acutely aware that the formal texts of the
GATT and related agreements provided only a partial window onto the normative system
that the regime embodied. It was well understood that, despite their formally binding,
‘hard’ legal status, the legal obligations imposed under these agreements were heavily
mediated by shared social understandings and political consensuses among participants in
the trading regime.81 Such understandings consisted of shared perceptions as to the
intended meaning and coverage of these provisions, as well as tacit agreements
designating certain disputed areas as off-limits (whatever the formal wording of the
agreements).
These perceptions have changed since the creation of the WTO. Primarily as a result of
the creation of the new dispute settlement system, there seems now to be a general
consensus that extra-legal and informal norms play a far less central role than they used
to. There is a stronger sense that there ever was that it is sufficient to study formal WTO
texts, and their associated jurisprudence, to discover the nature and extent of the WTO’s
normative framework, and therefore its potential impact. In many ways this sense is
justified: there is no doubt that important changes occurred at the transformation of the
GATT into the more formal WTO system. But it is equally important not to overstate
these transformations, and fall into an excessively formalist approach to the WTO legal
system. In the same way as in any legal system, the texts of WTO law are embedded
within a rich framework of social norms at play within the trading regime. These
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informal norms interact with – modify, reconstitute, express and give meaning to – those
formal rules in various complex ways, and at a variety of stages in their operation.82
For one thing, they influence the kinds of social situations in which legal norms are
typically operative. Take for example, the prohibition on discrimination in respect of
domestic regulation, contained in GATT Article III and GATS Article XVII. While the
formal scope of application of these provisions is very wide, in principle covering
virtually the universe of internal regulatory measures which affect trade, in practice their
operation has been considerably more limited. This is, in part, because of the existence of
a variety of informal norms and tacit understandings which tell us what sorts of
regulation can properly be thought of as an impediment to trade, and what sorts simply
have nothing to do with trade. Of course, these informal norms are not always welldefined, and certainly vary over time. Before the 1980s, for example, internal regulations
of any sort were rarely the subject of trade dispute. Since then, however, particular
regulatory fields have come to be perceived as potential sources of trade barriers, and as
legitimate targets of trade disputes: health and safety regulation, consumer protection
regulation, and industrial policy are examples. Other fields – such as public interest
regulation of essential service suppliers, affirmative action policies in respect of
marginalized groups, social labelling schemes, or even renewable energy policy83 – are
arguably in the early stages of the same process. It is important to make clear that here I
am not referring to the changes to the formal scope of application of WTO disciplines on
domestic regulation. Rather, I am referring the evolution of the broader social and
normative framework regulating which domestic regulatory interventions typically come
to the attention of trade policy-makers, and, conversely, and determining whether private
traders tend to think of trade law as a possible remedy when they are confronted by
particular regulatory difficulties.
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Similarly, informal or tacit normative understandings regulate which disputes are
ultimately brought before the WTO dispute resolution machinery. A decision whether or
not to bring WTO proceedings is not just a matter of strategic calculation, it is also partly
determined by social norms – particularly norms which tell participations the kinds of
situations which the provisions were originally intended to cover, the purposes dispute
settlement can legitimately be used for, and the kinds of questions dispute settlement
bodies are capable of answering. Again, the non-discrimination norms can be used as an
example, and in particular the application of those norms to sub-federal measures. There
is a genuine question whether differential treatment across state jurisdictions within a
federal state can in some circumstances constitute discriminatory treatment under GATS
Articles II and XVII: authority on the question is thin, but some comments within both
GATT and WTO jurisprudence seem to suggest that cross-jurisdictional differential
treatment may constitute discrimination.84 Discussions on the question in the context of
the Negotiating Group on Services revealed a widespread consensus that (whatever the
precise wording of the GATS) the non-discrimination norm was never intended to catch
differential treatment of this sort, though Members could not agree on an appropriate way
forward on the issue.85 Documents from those meetings evidence an informal agreement
that dispute settlement proceedings will not be brought in respect of such matters – an
understanding which appears to have been relatively effective in the period since.86 Few
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examples will be so explicit and easily identified: most often understandings about what
kinds of measures may legitimately be the subject of dispute settlement are by nature
tacit, submerged, fluid and often underspecified. Nevertheless, they can be powerful, and
to implicitly exclude them from our definition of trade law inevitably on occasion leads
to an incomplete and sometimes skewed portrait of the content and effects of WTO legal
constraints.
*
Taken together, these four critiques add up to the core claim that the trade and human
rights literature – like most literature on the trade regime generally – has so far proceeded
on the basis of a partial and somewhat misleading picture of the impact of the trade
regime on the enjoyment of human rights. But why does this matter? It matters because
our knowledge of the impacts of the trade regime fundamentally shapes our reformative
efforts: it helps us to determine which are the most important issues to address (and
which are not), it informs our ideas of what kind of change is possible and desirable (and
those kinds that are not), and it deeply structures the way we imagine the range of
potential futures for the trade regime. In the trade and human rights debate, the legal
centralist framework within which it operates has tended to generate a reformative
agenda focussed predominantly on changes to the formal legal rules contained in WTO
agreements, and to the processes by which these rules are generated, interpreted, and
applied.87 Sometimes, this may mean imposing stricter liberalization commitments:
stronger disciplines on domestic agricultural subsidy programs, rules ensuring enhanced
market access for developing country exports, and so on. More often, however, it takes
the form of advocacy for a relaxation the constraints imposed by trade law, on the basis
that the policies required (or prohibited) by trade law can undermine (or enhance) the
enjoyment of human rights. It is notable that human rights language has most often and
arising in this area to dispute settlement but would try to settle them through bilateral consultations.
However, participants must assume their own responsibilities in deciding whether any measures of this sort
which they maintain should be scheduled or made the subject of MFN exemptions - though in this respect
also it is hoped that restraint will be shown.”
87
Often, in fact, this is coupled with a claim that incorporating human rights into these processes in some
sense will contribute to that agenda. I explore the claim that human rights have something to offer trade
policy-making processes in Part 3 below.
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most forcefully been deployed to advance the concept of ‘policy space’.88 For example,
human rights considerations have been advanced to argue in favour of: new general
exceptions to GATT disciplines; less restrictive interpretations of GATT nondiscrimination obligations; an exemption from certain AoA obligations in respect of
development measures; increased flexibilities for developing countries in respect of both
the level and timing of liberalization commitments; interpretations of the SPS agreement
which allow greater scope for precautionary regulation, among many others.89 The
influence of legal centralism here is clear: since the WTO is conceptualized as a
constraint on behaviour, remedial proposals tend to focus on removing those constraints,
and creating greater ‘policy autonomy’.
My main concern with agenda is what it does not do. I explained above how the trade
regime does much more than simply act as a constraint on state behaviour, and is much
more than simply a set of binding legal obligations. It is an environment in which, among
many other things, the liberal trade project is constituted and given meaning, in which
states are taught what it means to be a liberal trading nation, in which norms of legitimate
and appropriate trade policy are generated and disseminating, and in which authorized
knowledge about the trading system and how it operates is generated and deployed by
88

For clarity, the notion of ‘policy space’ refers to at least three distinct claims: that WTO Members should
not be required to put in place liberalizing policies where such policies have a negative impact on the
enjoyment of human rights; that Members should not be prohibited from pursuing policy options which
have (or could have) a beneficial impact on the enjoyment of human rights; and that individuals and
communities should as far as possible be free to choose their own goals and make their own choices
without undue external constraint or impediment.
89
The work of the High Commissioner, for example, has strongly emphasized the need for further
‘flexibility’ in WTO agreements, as well as the need to use existing flexibilities: see, ‘The impact of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on human rights’,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13, 27 June 2001, at para 28; ‘Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of
human rights’, E/CN.4/2002/54, 15 January 2002, at paras 34, 48, 53; ‘Liberalization of trade in services
and human rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002, at paras 51-67. See also generally CIEL, Going
with the Flow: How International Trade, Finance and Investment Regimes Affect the Provision of Water to
the Poor, Center for International Environmental Law (2003); M. Krajewski, National regulation and trade
liberalization in services: the legal impact of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) on
national regulatory autonomy (2003); T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn, 'Linking Trade Regulation and
Human Rights in International Law: An Overview' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human
Rights and International Trade (2005), 1 at 23 (“[t]rade regulation should be shaped in a manner that
permits Members of the WTO to pursue appropriate domestic human rights policies …”); C. Dommen,
'Human Rights and Trade: Two Practical Suggestions for Promoting Coordination and Coherence' in T.
Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 199 at 200; K.
Gallagher, Putting development first: the importance of policy space in the WTO and IFIs (2005).
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states in the formulation of their interests. Far from simply permitting or prohibiting
specific trade policies, it helps to constitute the fundamental ideational and political
context in which trade policies are imagined and implemented – and which in many
respects determines their ultimate effects. The point is that an agenda which focusses on
modifying the obligations imposed in WTO agreements simply does not engage with
these broader processes, and has little to say to them. More than that, it tends to divert
attention away from these processes, and make them less visible. By equating the absence
of overt legal disciplines on states’ policy choices with ‘policy autonomy’, the trade and
human rights literature encourages us to see the preferences and choices of WTO
Members as pre-existing their interaction with the WTO, and as a given part of the
landscape in which the international trade regime operates.
This is problematic from two perspectives. First, there is I believe an urgent need for the
critical energies of human rights (and other) commentators to be directed toward these
more diffuse mechanisms by which the trade regime determines the nature and effects of
the present international trading system. It is important to understand the precise
processes by which these mechanisms work, and to build a picture of their impacts, in
order to appreciate in what ways they are (and are not) complicit in producing some of
the less beneficial aspects and outcomes of the international trading system. This would
then enable engagement with, and transformation of, those processes as appropriate. If I
am right, and these more diffuse mechanisms are in the long run more significant
determinants of the character of the international trading system than the specific
obligations imposed in WTO agreements, then failure to critically engage with them
means that the trade and human rights debate is to a significant extent simply missing the
point. Second, attending to the variety of modes of influence that the WTO yields can
help us to imagine productive ways in which the trade regime can be involved in the
pursuit of a range of desirable social projects – such as development, or the protection of
human rights, and so on. When we think of the WTO as essentially a set of constraining
rules, then the kinds of things it can offer these projects is relatively limited. Primarily,
the task is to ensure that it does not interfere with their pursuit. But once we realise that,
for example, the WTO plays a teaching function, the possibility is raised that it might be

40

harnessed as a site of policy learning, a venue for the production and exchange of
innovative policy knowledge.90 Similarly, once we realise that it also plays a normative
role – disseminating ideas of legitimate and desirable trade policy, and constructing the
values and purposes associated with the liberal trade project – then it becomes clear that
the WTO could function as a valuable space for the deliberative and discursive renewal
of the liberal trade project, and provide tools and a venue for the collective re-imagining
of that project. And finally, if it is true that the WTO acts in part to mobilize particular
constituencies and facilitate their insertion into trade policy-making processes, then it
might be fruitful to ask how these spaces and mobilizing forces might be exploited to
generate yet broader and more active public participation in respect of trade policy
questions.91
But if my main concern is what the present trade and human rights literature fails to
address, there is also a real question whether its present reformative agenda is likely or
able to achieve the kind of transformative change which it promises. For one thing, we
learnt above that modifications to the rules of the GATT/WTO system can often have
surprising and complex social effects, which vary significantly from context to context
both in their nature and their strength, and which at times run directly counter those
which are intended. This suggests that agenda for change should be formulated not so
much in terms of changes to particular rules – new exceptions for developing countries,
alternative interpretive choices in the Article XX jurisprudence, greater AMS reduction
commitments, and so on – but rather in terms of the social outcomes which those changes
are intended to produce. It also suggests the need for constant monitoring of the extent to
which they do in fact produce those outcomes – and for flexibility, critical reflection and
revision where they do not, or where they produce additional unintended and undesirable
effects. This runs counter to the implicit tendency in the current debate to spend far more
time discussing and debating the merits of particular rules on the basis of their intended
90

On the potential of the WTO as a site of learning, see, eg B. Hoekman, 'Operationalizing the Concept of
Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment', (2005) 8 Journal of International
Economic Law 405; Cooney and Lang, “Taking uncertainty seriously: Adaptive governance, alien invasive
species and the WTO” (forthcoming).
91
This last possibility, it should be noted, is to some extent already happening within the broader literature
connecting the WTO with principles of democratic governance.

41

or apparent effects, and far less attention to the socio-legal questions of how particular
changes to the rules play themselves out over time in different contexts.
We also learnt above that GATT/WTO legal disciplines, while clearly important, are not
as important or salient a factor in regulatory decision-making as is often assumed. Is it
reasonable, then, to pursue a strategy of achieving transformative change to the trading
order primarily through a modification of WTO rules? Current efforts to achieve dramatic
increases in market access for developing country goods through the negotiation of
significantly stricter legal commitments on the part of the industrialized world seem
based on an overestimation of the centrality of international legal obligations in the
formulation of trade policy, as well as a misreading of the way the GATT/WTO system
has operated over its history. There is a strong case to be made that the success of that
system in presiding over a dramatic period of liberalization owes much more to its ability
to generate and sustain among policy elites a shared normative commitment in favour of
liberalization, and to teach them to think about the trading system in ways which make
liberalization appear rational and desirable to them. Similarly, much advocacy in favour
of greater ‘policy flexibility’ under WTO law seems equally to be based on an
overestimation of the central role that WTO law plays in directing and constraining
policy-making. As argued above, the reality is that WTO law is often only one relatively
minor constraint in a sea of pressures facing regulators, and most domestic regulation of
direct concern to human rights advocates is determined only at the margin by WTO legal
constraints. Policy-makers in developing countries, for example, are subject to acute
constraints emanating from other international organizations, from the demands of capital
markets, bilaterally from trading partners, from local industry groups, and so on.92 There
is therefore no guarantee that, were Members’ to be accorded greater flexibility under
WTO law, they would necessarily be either willing or able to exploit it. (Indeed, it is
interesting to note to date no country has exploited the system put in place by the Doha
92

The point I make here, about the existence of multiple and interrelated causes, is related to a point made
by other commentators that the human rights movement tends to focus on the responsibility of individual
actors (or organizations), with the result that it is less able to recognise and adequately address structural
causes of injustice and poverty: eg, T. Evans and J. Hancock, 'Doing Something Without Doing Anything:
International Human Rights Law and the Challenge of Globalisation', (1998) 2 International Journal of
Human Rights 1.
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accord.93) Arguably, therefore, there might be more productive directions for the energy
of the human rights movement than ensuring sufficient regulatory ‘autonomy’ from the
strictures of trade law.94
It is important not to overstate my case. My claim is emphatically not that the present
reformative agenda which has arisen out of the trade and human rights debate is
necessarily ineffective, nor that changes to WTO obligations are unimportant. Rather, I
am arguing for a more realistic assessment of their importance, and therefore a more open
and explicit consideration of what is the most important use of critical energies. I am
suggesting that a much more fine-grained analysis is needed of the trade-offs implicit in
advocating for legal change at the WTO. What are the opportunity costs of pursuing an
agenda of legal change to (say) TRIPs Article 31(f)? What is not on the WTO agenda
because this issue is? How much political capital is being spent which could have been
spent on other issues? What issues and venues escape notice because our attention is
focussed on the WTO? In part because of the legal centralist frame within which the
debate is carried out, many human rights critiques of the WTO too often simply assume
the central importance of WTO law on the relevant issues. They too rarely include a
detailed and explicit comparison of the most pressing needs facing WTO Members in
particular areas of concern to human rights actors, and an evaluation of the best allocation
of scarce political, institutional, financial and advocacy resources. A more accurate and
fine-grained representation of the varied impacts of the trade regime would help to make
the arguments of human rights advocates more responsive to the realities of decisionmaking practices on the ground.
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That is to say, there have no formal notifications as of August 2006, though there have been suggestions
of an increase in the use of compulsory licenses other than through this mechanism, see for example,

http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/twninfohealth004.htm.
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It may be argued, that, far from taking energy and resources away from other issues, major public
campaigns critical of the WTO have in fact energized support for related initiatives. Matthews, for
example, has argued that probably the most important role of the TRIPs and public health campaign was its
role in raising the profile of the issue of particular epidemics in developing countries, and thus generating a
momentum for other (non-WTO) mechanisms to address them: D. Matthews, 'WTO Decision on
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the Trips Agreement and Public Health: a
Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?' (2004) 7(1) Journal of International Economic
Law 73.
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3.

LEAVE IT TO THE EXPERTS? UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN
TRADE POLICY DEBATES

At this point in my argument, I want to shift the focus from the trade regime to the human
rights movement. If one of the core claims of the trade and human rights literature is that
the trading system can have negative effects on the enjoyment of human rights, the other
is that human rights can in some sense help to produce a better trading system.
“Achieving fair and equitable trade liberalization by adopting human rights approaches to
WTO rules”, the UN Human Rights Commissioner has argued, “will be an important step
in establishing a just international and social order”.95 In this section I interrogate this
notion of a ‘human rights approach’ to trade liberalization. What role can the human
rights movement play in re-making the trading system? What precisely do human rights
have to offer trade policy debates?96 My aim is not to analyse and evaluate competing
proposals for reform of the WTO, nor to argue for or against particular trade policy
changes. Rather, it is to reflect, and to encourage further reflection, on what role – if any
– human rights actors and institutions can constructively play in debates about these
questions.
There is one point I should make about the perspective from which I approach this task. I
am most interested in what human rights have to offer at the level of ideas and knowledge
about what kind of trade policy is desirable and legitimate. My starting point for thinking
about this more specific issue is to draw a distinction between two different sets of ideas.
95

OHCHR, ‘Globalization and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights’, E/CN.4/2002/54, 15
January 2002; at para 9. See also, C. Dommen, 'Human Rights and Trade: Two Practical Suggestions for
Promoting Coordination and Coherence' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and
International Trade (2005), 199 at 198, suggesting that collaboration between trade and human rights
professionals “can really contribute to ensuring that trade rules are developed and applied in ways that
promote an equitable economy”.
96
A somewhat similar set of questions has been asked in relation to human rights and development. For an
excellent critical discussion, see Alston, “A Human Rights Perspective on the Millennium Development
Goals”, Paper presented as a contribution to the work of the Millennium Project Task Force on Poverty and
Economic Development, and references cited therein. See also ‘Study on policies for development in a
globalizing world: what can the human rights approach contribute?’, Note by the Secretariat,
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/18, 7 June 2004.
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The first set are made up of ‘primary’ ideas about what trade policy ought to be, and what
the trading system ought to look like. Such ideas are obviously continually evolving, and
subject to contestation, but at any point in time there is an identifiable set of beliefs which
can be characterised as orthodox, and which is widely shared among policy elites. These
ideas themselves are founded upon a body of technical knowledge of the causal dynamics
of the trading system, and what the effects of particular trade policy interventions are
likely to be. The second set of ideas consists of ‘secondary’ ideas about how ‘primary’
ideas ought to be produced – a set of beliefs about how societies ought properly to go
about finding solutions to the problems thrown up by international trade. In trade policy
as in many other policy areas, these beliefs are currently shaped by a normative
framework of technical rationality. They include the beliefs that international trade forms
a relatively independent policy domain, and that questions arising in this domain ought to
be decided by trained experts deploying socially sanctioned forms of rational knowledge.
They also include a set of ideas about who counts as an expert, how experts act, and what
counts as relevant knowledge for these experts to use. The result of these secondary
norms is that the production and evaluation of ideas and knowledge about what trade
policy ought to be tends to involve particular kinds of people, particular kinds of
vocabularies and arguments, and particular kinds of cognitive and conceptual
frameworks.
These observations are hardly new97, but they have a twofold significance in the trade
and human rights debate. On the one hand, they suggest that the human rights movement
must engage at the level of ideas and knowledge if it is to fulfil its promise of helping to
re-make the international economic order. Whatever else shapes trade policy, it is clear
that prevailing technical ideas about what kind of trade policy is rational and desirable
deeply influence the shape of the international trading system.98 Without some change in
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For an excellent treatment of international organizations as ‘bureaucracies’, drawing on a long Weberian
tradition of research into rational bureaucratic governance structures, see M.N. Barnett and M. Finnemore,
'The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations', (1999) 53(4) International
Organization 699; M.N. Barnett and M. Finnemore, Rules for the world: international organizations in
global politics (2004).
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On the role of ‘ideas’ in the formulation of trade policy, see generally J. Goldstein, 'Ideas, institutions,
and American trade policy', (1988) 42(1) International Organization 179; J. Goldstein, Ideas, interests, and
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these ideas, a genuine transformation of the international trading order is considerably
less likely. On the other hand, this same commitment to technical rationality makes it
more difficult for human rights actors to engage substantively in trade policy debates, and
therefore to influence the evolution of policy knowledge. After all, human rights actors –
at least in their capacity as human rights actors – are not trade policy experts. What, then,
can they tell us about what trade policy ought to be which those experts do not already
know? It is not just a question of expertise, but also a linguistic question. The technical
idiom of technical trade policy debates tends to exclude from the start the kind of ‘values
talk’ characteristic of human rights language. It is a presupposition of such debates that
the kinds of questions that they deal with are not amenable to resolution through moral
language – by definition, they call for the application of technical expertise. Furthermore,
as is commonly observed, it is fundamental to experts’ identity and ongoing legitimacy
that they present themselves as apolitical, in the sense of rationally implementing a social
goals defined elsewhere.99 Values talk does not easily fit within that culture. As will
become clear below, my thinking about the role of the human rights movement in
producing a new international trade order is deeply informed by both prongs of this
dilemma – the crucial need to engage in the domain of trade policy knowledge, and the
considerable obstacles to doing so.
Under the first three headings which follow, I set out and interrogate what I see as the
three most common conceptions of what ‘human rights’ bring to trade policy debates.100
American trade policy (1993); J. Goldstein and R.O. Keohane, Ideas and foreign policy: beliefs,
institutions, and political change (1993).
99
See, for example, M.N. Barnett and M. Finnemore, Rules for the world: international organizations in
global politics (2004).
100
Because of the way that I have framed this dilemma, there is at least one model which I do not address
in this paper. This model see human rights protection – conceived in traditional terms as the protection of
freedom of expression and other democratic freedoms, some guarantees of distributive justice, and so on –
as in many respects complementary to, and supportive of, well-functioning markets and international trade.
To simplify: human rights law, in this model, provides a set of ‘flanking policies’ which ought to
accompany trade liberalization, in order to ensure that trade liberalization brings its promised benefits. See
generally, T. Cottier, 'Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover', (2002) 5(1) Journal of
International Economic Law 111; T. Cottier and S. Khorana, 'Linkages between Freedom of Expression
and Unfair Competition Rules in International Trade: The Hertel Case and Beyond' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi
and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 245, as well as the work of
Petersmann, eg, E.U. Petersmann, 'The WTO Constitution and Human Rights', (2000) 3(1) Journal of
International Economic Law 19; E.U. Petersmann, 'Human Rights and International Economic Law in the
21st Century: The Need to Clarify their Interrelationships', (2001) 4 Journal of International Economic

46

Some argue that the trade and human rights debate is essentially one about coherence
between international regimes, and that therefore it makes no sense to ask ‘what human
rights bring’ to the debate. I suggest that this framework obscures more than it reveals,
and explain how it actually helps to undermine the transformative power of the human
rights movement. Others suggest that human rights provides a set of substantive values
and rules which can guide trade policy choices. I argue, on the contrary, that this is
illusory, and represents an oversimplified account of how human rights language and
advocacy works. And yet others claim that, even if human rights cannot define on their
own what trade policy ought to be, they do provide a variety of potentially effective
political tools for achieving desirable trade policy outcomes. While I substantially agree
with this claim as far as it goes, I question whether – if this is all that human rights do –
the human rights movement can ever instigate genuinely transformative change. Under
the fourth and fifth headings, I offer two more ways to conceptualize the role of human
rights in trade policy debates. In keeping with my interest in the production of trade
policy knowledge, I argue first of all that the human rights movement can help to provide
a trigger for policy learning – it can help, in other words, to facilitate and enable the
production of new ideas about desirable trade policy. Second, I suggest that the human
rights movement may be helping to transform the ‘secondary’ beliefs I referred to above
– beliefs about how trade policy ideas ought to be generated and evaluated, and by
whom. In some ways, these two conceptions are simply explicit theories describing what
Law 3; E.U. Petersmann, 'Time for a United Nations 'Global Compact' for Integrating Human Rights into
the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration', (2002) 13(3) European Journal
of International Law 621; E.U. Petersmann, 'Taking Human Dignity, Poverty and Empowerment of
Individuals More Seriously: Rejoinder to Alston', (2002) 13(4) European Journal of International Law
845; E.U. Petersmann, 'Human Rights and the Law of the World Trade Organization', (2003) 37(2) Journal
of World Trade 241; E.U. Petersmann, 'The 'Human Rights Approach' Advocated by the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights and by the International Labour Organization', (2004) 7(3) Journal of
International Economic Law 605; E.U. Petersmann, 'Human Rights and International Trade Law: Defining
and Connecting the Two Fields' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and
International Trade (2005), 29. Furthermore, I do not address (increasingly rare) arguments that the WTO
system can be used ‘positively’ to enforce human rights norms, as in the debates on human rights
conditionality. On the distinction between the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ aspects of the trade and human
rights debate see E.U. Petersmann, 'Time for a United Nations 'Global Compact' for Integrating Human
Rights into the Law of Worldwide Organizations: Lessons from European Integration', (2002) 13(3)
European Journal of International Law 621; M. Green, 'Integrating Enforcement of Human Rights Laws
with Enforcement of Trade Laws: Some Baseline Issues' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.),
Human Rights and International Trade (2005), 236 at 237; J. Pauwelyn, 'Human Rights in WTO Dispute
Settlement' in T. Cottier, E. Bürgi and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Human Rights and International Trade (2005),
205 at 206.
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human rights actors are already doing. But they are also more than that, to the extent that
clearer understandings of what it is that human rights actors can and do offer can lead to
more targeted and more productive interventions into trade policy debates.
1.

Fragmentation and coherence

For many commentators, the trade and human rights debate is fundamentally concerned
with balancing competing social values. As desirable and legitimate as the liberal trade
project is, many argue, it is still only one among a huge variety of social projects which
states and their populations value. Alternative values – such as consumer protection,
economic stability, environmental protection, and so on – at times need to be balanced
against the demands of trade liberalization. At the national level, complex institutional,
legal and political mechanisms typically exist to resolve such policy trade-offs. But (so
this argument runs) no such mechanisms exist at the international level: international
political and institutional life is characterized primarily by fragmentation, by a relative
absence of mechanisms of coordination, collaboration and coherence across policy fields.
The crucial task, therefore, is to design precisely those kinds of mechanisms, “in an
attempt to provide greater coherence to international … policy-making and a more
balanced international and social order”.101 This is particularly true for the trade regime:
“[t]he relationship between trade values … and other values”, writes Trachtman, “is a
critical challenge [for] the WTO.”102
Within what I will call the ‘coherence framework’, these normative conflicts between
‘trade values’ and ‘other values’ also have an institutional and legal dimension. Different
categories of social preferences or values tend to be associated with different institutions:
the WTO with a preference for trade liberalization (or the benefits that trade liberalization
101

OHCHR, ‘Liberalization of trade in services and human rights’, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9, 25 June 2002, at
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J.P. Trachtman, 'The Constitutions of the WTO', (2006) 17(3) European Journal of International Law
623, 634. For works which illustrate this coherence framework in a clear and sophisticated manner, see, for
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International Economic Law 111, the chapters by Mosoti, Breining-Kaufman, Dommen and Ranjan in T.
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is thought to provide, however they are conceptualized); the ILO with the value of labour
rights protection; environmental organizations with the value of environmental
protection; and so on. Because institutions are seen in this way in functional terms – as
created by way of response to a particular subset of social demands103 – problems of
normative coherence come to be seen as closely related to patterns of institutional
isolation and collaboration. Similarly, as each international regime is associated with a
particular sub-field of international law – international trade law; international
environmental law; or international human rights law – formal conflicts between the rules
of these different sub-fields of international law are understood as the “legal face” of the
underlying normative conflicts described in the previous paragraph.104
How are human rights said to fit into this framework? It is useful to distinguish between
two different claims, which might be termed the ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ claim respectively.
The strong claim is that human rights provide a normative framework within which to
resolve value trade-offs.105 Human rights, in other words, can help us to solve the
problems thrown up by fragmentation in a legitimate and appropriate way. Different
commentators have forwarded different reasons for why the language of human rights is
particularly well-suited to the task of balancing of competing social values. First, and
most obviously, human rights themselves can be understood as representing a set of
values which ought to be given special weight in resolving value trade-offs. Arguably,
the entire human rights edifice can be thought of as an attempt to define and categorize
those values which are regarded as particularly fundamental, and as commanding special
moral force and legitimacy. Second, human rights bodies have considerable experience
with the task of balancing competing social values in particular contexts. As a result,
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human rights law and discourse contain a wide variety of tools and mechanisms with
which policy-makers and judicial bodies are familiar, which have proven to be
operationally robust in a variety of different contexts.106 Third, it is said that human rights
is a sufficiently open discourse that many different kinds of values or social demands can
be expressed within it. The ‘sensibility’ of human rights, that is to say, is peculiarly
sensitive to a variety of competing social demands. Furthermore, within human rights
discourse, different values (as ‘interdependent and indivisible’ rights) begin from a
position of presumptively equal strength. Human rights therefore may offer a language
which is less susceptible to claims of systematic bias than other languages. This claim, it
should be noted, is typically made in the context of an analogous critique: that decisions
involving trade-offs should not be left to the trade regime, as it is more likely to exhibit a
systemic bias in favour of ‘trade values’, and to be less responsive to the full breadth of
social demands.107
How attractive is this as a way of thinking about what human rights offers trade policy
debates? In my view, it is vulnerable to a number of compelling criticisms. For one thing,
trade-off questions raise vitally important and highly contested political issues, of the
kind that can never finally be resolved. It is therefore misleading to talk as if they can be
conclusively settled simply by reference to set of human rights norms, as if the relative
priority to be accorded to new and evolving international projects has already been
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determined in advance. Too often, this ‘strong’ claim seems to be deployed to close off
debate about normative conflicts, rather than open it. Second, it is not self-evident that
social projects and values which are expressed in rights terms need necessarily be given
more weight than those which cannot.108 It is important to remember that what constitutes
a ‘human rights violation’ or ‘human rights issue’ at any particular point in time is in part
socially and politically constructed, and that the processes by which particular injustices
are produced as human rights issues are inevitably selective and partly arbitrary. Who
decides which social projects are expressive of human rights values, and which are not?
And why, indeed, should we accord less priority to those deeply held values which, for
one reason or another, cannot or have not been expressed in the language of human
rights? Third, there is the question of institutional competence. The claim that normative
conflicts ought to be resolved by recourse to human rights principles does not necessarily
imply the further claim that human rights institutions ought themselves to play a central
role in the resolution of such conflicts. Nevertheless, that is a likely outcome of taking
seriously the use of human rights in this way. It is not at all clear, however, that
international human rights bodies as presently constituted are up to this task. At the very
least, there is a need to make a stronger case that these institutions are well-placed – or at
least are better suited than imaginable alternatives, including a reformed trade regime.
Fourth and finally, although it is claimed that the use of a human rights framework can
help to resolve trade-off questions, often the result is simply to defer or displace these
questions. For example, even if we agree that social values expressed as human rights
should be accorded a degree of priority, a question remains as to which values can and
should in fact be expressed in human rights terms. Petersmann, for example, sees tradeoffs between trade liberalization and (say) the protection of vulnerable minorities as
involving a balancing of competing rights.109 Others strongly disagree.110 While some
contestation of the language of human rights is to be expected, and we should not too
hastily conclude that human rights language is indeterminate, we do well to remember
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that the content and meaning of human rights language is itself strongly contested, and
may not always provide the substantial guidance that it promises.
Let me turn then to the ‘weak’ claim. This argument is that the protection of human rights
is one normative project among the many needing to be balanced against the demands of
trade liberalization. Greater coherence in international policy-making, on this view,
means striking a better balance between the demands of trade liberalization and the
protection of human rights. Different commentators have different views on what an
appropriate balance is. Some suggest that human rights ought usually to take priority,
others note simply that it is “difficult to say which in the abstract should prevail as a
matter of principle”.111 Observe that within this framework, it makes little sense to ask
what human rights offer trade policy debates. Since the problem to be addressed is
precisely the potential for conflict between the trade and human rights regimes – or the
values they are taken to represent – the relevance of human rights language is assumed
from the beginning. To the extent that the language of human rights has a role to play, it
is simply to ensure that the goal of protecting human rights is given due weight in
decisions affecting that goal. As noted above, it ought to be remembered that the debate
about coherence takes place against the background of a concern that – because of the
institutional strength of the WTO – ‘trade values’ tend in practice to be given priority
over other values at the international level. The virtue of human rights, on this view, is
that it provides a powerful institutional voice in which to articulate alternative social
demands on the international level. Human rights, that is to say, can help to correct the
perceived imbalance in the international system, according to which the liberal trade
project tends in practice to undermine or override other legitimate social projects.112
This vision of how and why human rights are relevant in trade policy debates has roved
very influential. As a result, many human rights commentators have concentrated much
of their energy on identifying and evaluating those circumstances in which actors within
the trade regime are required to balance the requirements of trade liberalization with the
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demands of those “non-trade values” associated with human rights.113 These
circumstances typically involve trade-restrictive measures designed to achieve a ‘human
rights purpose’. (The purpose of the relevant measure ranges widely, from consumer
protection, to food safety, to public health protection, to protection of minorities.) The
declared aim of much of this work is to design an institutional and normative framework
to ensure that decisions involving such sensitive balancing are made in an appropriate,
sensitive and legitimate manner. Thus, Cottier argues that we:
need a framework which allows equality of legitimate interests to be taken into account,
brings about practical co-ordination of differing policy goals, and allows for balancing of
the fundamental interests involved.114

Different commentators have proposed different means for ensuring that decision-making
processes within the trade regime take due account of their impact on human rights. The
UN High Commissioner argues for assessments of the human rights impacts of proposed
trade rules before they are agreed, as well as direct participation by UN human rights
bodies in some aspects of the WTO’s work.115 The Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (CESCR) has reminded WTO Members that they are bound by human
rights obligations in multilateral trade negotiations.116 Abbott makes a case for the WTO
to create “highly integrated relations with other multilateral institutions”117; while
Dommen calls for better integration and the national level, between government
departments.118 A complementary line of argument addresses questions of allocation of
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decision-making power as between the trade and human rights regimes. Howse and
Nicolaidis, for example, argue that the trade regime ought (at times) to show deference to
other international institutions, including those comprising the human rights regime.119
Trachtman, too, argues that we need “rules that allocate authority” among different
functional institutions.120 Another important focus of attention has been research into the
potential use of human rights law to guide decisions made by WTO quasi-judicial bodies,
in those cases which implicate sensitive normative conflicts. This body of work has
covered a range of issues: the rules of international law governing questions of priority
where international legal obligations conflict; the potential uses of human rights law as an
interpretive guide by WTO panels and the Appellate Body; as well as arguments relating
to the use of human rights law as a substantive defence to violations of WTO law.121 In a
similar vein, others have argued for the incorporation of a reference to human rights into
the texts of WTO agreements, either as an objective of trade liberalization within the
Preamble, or more specifically in the form of general human rights exception(s) to
liberalization obligations.122 What is common to all of these mechanisms of co-ordination
– whether legal, organization or normative – is that they are seen as a response to the
same basic dilemma: namely, how to ensure that an appropriate balance is struck where
the imperatives of the liberal trade project must be weighed against the need to protect
human rights.
Is this, then, a useful and productive way of thinking about the role of human rights
language in trade policy debates? There is no doubt that this literature on ‘coherence’
119
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between the trade and human rights regimes has produced important insights and
research. Nevertheless, I have one significant concern about this literature, the source of
which lies in the premises on which the coherence framework is based.
As I have explained more fully elsewhere,123 in my view contemporary public debates
over the international trade regime are fundamentally about the social purpose of the
liberal trade project. We commonly think of the purpose of the trade regime in stylized,
functional terms as the liberalization of trade. But the reality is that the regime is
informed by a much ‘thicker’ sense of purpose, deeply connected to the social and
political context within which it operates. Over the course of its history, a variety of
different overarching goals of the postwar trading regime have been given different
emphases at different times. These include, among others, the reconstruction of postwar
Europe, the maintenance of international and domestic economic stability, the reduction
of tariffs (or, at different times, ‘trade barriers’ and ‘trade distortions’), the generation of
a ‘global market’ in goods and services, and the effort to drive global economic growth.
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From this perspective, the normative conflicts, or ‘values trade-offs’, described earlier
look different from how they are normally understood. What matters is less in the
outcomes of those trade-off decisions – that is, which values win out in any particular
instance – than in the processes by which they are resolved. This is because it is in the
process of discussing, debating and resolving these normative conflicts that shared ideas
about the purpose of the liberal trade project are generated and disseminated – it is, after
all, by reference to such shared ideas that normative conflicts are identified in the first
place. Thus, from my point of view, the primary reason that decisions involving value
trade-offs are interesting and important is that they represent a key site in which the
fundamental goals and value commitments of the trade regime – what we think of when
we say ‘trade values’ – can be contested, renegotiated and redefined. They represent
points at which internal contradictions and tensions within prevailing narratives can be
leveraged to force a re-consideration of the underlying purposes of the regime. Such
trade-offs are not exceptional, but ubiquitous. And, crucially, they do not involve a
contest between trade regime and other social projects, but rather are constitutive of the
liberal trade project itself.
Through the language of coherence and fragmentation, however, such contestation over
the goals, purposes and normative foundations of the liberal trade project is re-cast as a
conflict between the liberal trade project and the protection of human rights. It is not
common to see coherence discourse in this way as discursively re-characterizing
normative conflicts, as in some sense ‘constructing’ the problem of inter-regime conflict.
It is much more common to think of inter-regime conflicts as objectively existing – preexisting problems demanding solutions. It is worth pausing briefly, therefore, to register
that conflicts between the trade and human rights regimes are not given but produced,
usually as a result of deliberate and strategic choices by political actors. Helfer’s notion
of ‘regime-shifting’ provides a useful analytical lens to make this point clear.126 Helfer’s
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primary concern is with the strategies which participants use when a regime – such as the
trade regime – begins to evolve in ways which are contrary to their interests. One such
strategy is that of ‘regime-shifting’. This involves taking particular issues which have
traditionally fallen within the mandate of (say) the trade regime, and debating and
discussing these issues in alternative international institutional forums. The purpose of
this is to generate “counter-regime norms”, which “provide new opportunities for states
and NGOs to contest established normative orthodoxies”.127 One of the perceived
benefits of this strategy is that it allows counter-hegemonic actors to reframe their
arguments as claims for coherence between regimes (rather than as claims for different
rules which suit their interests better).128 This is seen to be advantageous: after all, it is
hard not to agree that international organizations ought to work together, and ought not to
undermine each other. It is particularly hard to disagree with the general principle that the
trade regime ought not to undermine the human rights regime, and ought not to force its
Members to violate their human rights obligations. Helfer’s analysis is rich with
implications, but for present purposes the lesson I wish to draw is a simple one: that
through the strategy of regime-shifting, normative conflicts over what the trade regime
ought to be have been re-framed as raising questions about the relationship between the
trade regime and “other organizations, other sources of international law, and non-trade
values”, and in particular about the relationship between trade liberalization and the
protection of human rights.129 In this sense, incoherence between the trade and human
rights regimes is a choice, not simply an historical fact.
Once this is understood, it becomes apparent that the real question we should be asking is
not whether human rights language helps us to identify and address trade-off questions in
a more appropriate or desirable manner. Rather, it is whether it is useful or constructive
to frame normative conflicts over the trading system as essentially problems of
incoherence – and as symptoms of the fragmentation of the international system. On
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balance, my view is that it is not. Put simply, the reason is that re-framing the argument
in this way actually undermines and limits the ability of human rights actors to generate
real change to the trading order. This is counter-intuitive, but relatively easy to explain.
One consequence of deploying the discourse of coherence and fragmentation is that our
attention is directed away from some of the most important questions that human rights
actors should be asking of the trade regime. First, as already intimated, questions about
the underlying value commitments, and social purpose, of the liberal trade project tend to
be put to one side. In their place, we have constitutionalist discussions about how to
ensure coherence between the trade project and the human rights project, as well as
formal discussions about how to resolve legal conflicts between obligations imposed by
the trade and human rights regimes. Through the language of coherence, critical
arguments which suggest a need for the re-constitution or reconstruction of the liberal
trade project have been redirected, so that they are now seen as raising questions which
are relevant solely to the relation between the WTO and the human rights regime. The
result is that the underlying purpose of the liberal trade project is neiter discussed nor revisioned. Second, the coherence framework diverts our attention away from the value
choices which are necessarily involved in constituting the liberal trade project. Instead,
discussion is focussed on the normative conflicts between ‘human rights values’ and (preconstituted) ‘trade values’. The result is that there is no indication or exploration of the
ways in which the values associated with human rights – which of course change
according to who is speaking, but often include such matters as equality, the protection of
vulnerable groups and minorities, social welfare, consumer protection, poverty
elimination, and so on – might be productively involved in contesting and reconstituting
the liberal trade project in the first place. Within this framework, human rights therefore
tend to appear in debates about trade policy solely as exceptions, adjuncts, or
complements to trade policy prescriptions.130 Third, the coherence framework
discourages critical engagement with the processes by which the trade regime is
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continually contested and redefined. This is because it reifies the trade regime: the trade
regime appears to us in this framework unproblematically as an “avatar”131 of particular
values or social demands. Its internal contradictions, its contingency, its indeterminacy
are shielded from view. The “politics of regime definition”132 are made invisible, and
human rights actors are thereby discouraged from contesting them.
Another consequence is that – paradoxically – the coherence framework tends to
reinforce prevailing ideas about what the trade regime ought to look like. It does this in at
least a couple of different ways. First of all, I said above that discussions of how to
resolve conflicts between ‘trade values’ and ‘non-trade values’ tend to produce and
disseminate shared ideas about what ‘trade values’ are. In the trade and human rights
debate, the concept of ‘trade values’ – to the extent that it is defined at all – tends to be
equated with the pursuit of “growth and prosperity”133, the pursuit of material wealth, or
“efficiency and money”.134 Putting to one side questions about the historical accuracy of
these characterizations, it is clear that speaking as if these are the values of the trade
regime helps to make it so. Similarly, speaking as if such values as distributional equity,
poverty elimination, protection of minorities, and economic and social stability are ‘nontrade’ or ‘human rights’ values clearly affects the way that the trade regime responds to
such goals. It makes them marginal to its essential project. The essential point is that how
we define the boundary between ‘trade’ and ‘human rights’ values affects our
understanding of what the animating purpose of the trade regime is, and therefore
profound shapes the deeper structure and operation of the trading system in the longer
term. Secondly, and less obviously, the mere fact that the objectives, values and
orientation of the trade regime are treated as pre-given also reinforces the status quo. I
noted at the beginning of this Part that trade policy knowledge tends to be produced and
evaluated by those with technical expertise, and that it is not clear what human rights
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actors can add in that domain. The coherence framework essentially attempts to sidestep
these difficulties: while we may look to technical experts to tell us what the international
trading system ought to look like, these experts tell us nothing about how to resolve
trade-offs between the demands of rational trade policy and other social demands – nor
can they. Even within a framework of technical rationality, such trade-offs are inevitably
a question of values, not a question of knowledge. The problem with this move is that it
reinforces the sense that questions of ‘pure’ trade policy raise solely technical questions
(not value trade-offs), and that these questions are not an appropriate domain of
contestation for human rights actors. That is, the coherence framework helps to exclude
human rights actors from debates about ‘pure’ trade policy – that is, about what trade
policy and the trade regime ought ideally to look like – and to reinforce the claims that
such questions are appropriately determined by traditional experts deploying prevailing
trade policy knowledge.
Against these criticisms that I have advanced, it may be argued that, even if the discourse
of coherence forecloses certain transformative possibilities, it opens up others. This is an
important point, and it is emphatically not my claim that the trade and human rights
literature arising from the coherence framework is unproductive or fruitless.
Nevertheless, on present evidence the possibilities that this framework opens seem to me
to be far less important than those which it forecloses. For example, I am somewhat
sceptical that the use of human rights law as an interpretive guide to WTO law will often
make a significant difference to how WTO agreements are ultimately interpreted. After
all, a requirement to consider the content of (often ambiguous) human rights instruments
will in my view have little effect unless the decision-makers are already sensitive to the
values which such instruments are designed to protect, and predisposed to interpreting
WTO law in a way which respects them. Conversely, if such sensitivity is present, it is
not clear that the interpretive guidance provided by human rights instruments adds much
other than a more legally sound justification for those decision-makers. Similarly,
without wishing to downplay either the desirability or importance of inter-institutional
collaboration, it is easy to see how most of the proposed mechanisms of inter-regime
engagement – formal and informal collaborations, mutual observer status, systematic

60

consideration of mutual impact, and so on – might have little actual impact on the
outcomes of the trading system, and in the end actually substitute for a more
thoroughgoing, reconstitution from the ground up of the trade regime itself. It is for these
reasons that I see the discourse on fragmentation and coherence as, in the end, limiting,
channelling and constraining the potentially disruptive and destabilizing influence of
critical human rights voices.
2.

Human rights as substantive policy guidance

Not all interventions into the trade and human rights debate see the debate primarily in
terms of inter-regime coherence. It is also very common to see human rights as offering a
normative framework for substantively reorienting trade policy and the trade regime. The
core claim is here that human rights norms, principles and rules can help to guide trade
policy-makers as they re-design the international trading system, and as they make
difficult trade policy choices. In a speech entitled “Shaping Globalization: the Role of
Human Rights”, for example, Mary Robinson argues for the need to “bring the values of
international human rights to the tables where decisions about the global economy are
bring made”.135 Howse and Mutua have similarly suggested that “the spirit of human
rights law must frame the development of trade law”,136 while Green refers to the need to
“see [the] WTO and other trade mechanisms restrained by human rights standards”.137 In
this model, human rights values and rules define the boundaries of acceptable trade
policy choices, and provide the substantive basis of an alternative vision for the
international trading system.
There have been a number of attempts to flesh out a little what this might look like. One
of the most influential of these attempts is that of the UN High Commissioner for Human
135
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Rights, in the context of the series of reports referred to earlier.138 Apart from procedural
prescriptions (dealt with below), the Human Commissioner argues, for example, that a
human rights approach to trade liberalization “sets the promotion and protection of
human rights as objectives of trade liberalization, not as exceptions.”139 At the level of
general principle, the High Commissioner believes that a human rights approach is
cautious about “relying [solely] on market forces to resolve problems concerning human
welfare”, and instead “emphasises the role of the State in the process of liberalization”.140
The High Commissioner also emphasizes the importance of international co-operation as
a primary means of achieving a fairer and more equitable international order.141 At a
normative level, a human rights approach to trade liberalization is said also to “focus on
individuals, in particular vulnerable individuals and groups”.142 Thus trade policies which
have an adverse impact on such groups tend not to be favoured by human rights. This last
point has been picked up and developed by others. Dommen, for example, argues that the
focus of human rights on “the most vulnerable and disadvantaged sectors of society” is
the “yardstick” which enables them to provide substantive policy guidance. A human
rights approach “will assess the effects of a particular policy on the most vulnerable
people within a country and will rule against choices that involve discrimination”.143
Notwithstanding the utility of these more general claims, it is clear that greater specificity
is required if human rights norms are to provide genuinely meaningful guidance to trade
policy-makers.144 While of course it is not in the nature of human rights principles to be
fully reducible to a universal set of policy prescriptions, nevertheless there would seem to
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be value in enhancing the specificity of human rights obligations as they apply to trade
policy, and thereby enhancing their practical utility to policy-makers. If it is not possible
to specify fully and in advance the kinds of trade policy which are prohibited or required
by human rights law, at least some examples can be developed, and a process and
methodology can be refined by which these questions can be answered in particular
contexts. So, those commentators who see the role of human rights in these terms – as
providing substantive policy guidance – largely see their task as spelling out in more
detail the precise normative and legal content of human rights as they apply in the field of
trade policy, so as to increase their utility as guiding principles.
How might this be done? The basic logic is clear: governments must not implement
certain trade policies where to do so would lead to a violation of their human rights
obligations; and they must conversely pursue those trade policies which, in their
circumstances, facilitate the progressive enjoyment of human rights. As applied to the
WTO, the basic claim is that WTO law must not require particular trade policies to the
extent that they may undermine the enjoyment of human rights, nor is it permitted to
prohibit policies to the extent that they enhance the enjoyment of human rights.145 This in
turn leads to a particular form of enquiry: elaboration of the normative and legal content
of the relevant human right; analysis of different trade policies (and WTO rules) and their
practical effects; a comparison of those effects to the kinds of outcomes envisaged or
required by the relevant right; and set of proposals for changes to either trade policies or
WTO rules to make them conform more closely to what human rights obligations require.
In this way, general human rights norms can apparently be transformed into into concrete
policy prescriptions.
An example will help to make the critique I advance below clearer. The High
Commissioner’s report on liberalization of trade in services is in a typical form. After an
introduction to the notion of ‘trade in services’ and the basic framework of the General
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Agreement on Trade in Services, the High Commissioner spends considerable time
setting out in some detail the content of the rights to health, education and development,
drawing on the General Comments of CESCR in doing so.146 The Commissioner
emphasises, among other things, that the right to health covers the availability,
accessibility, acceptability and quality of health facilities, that states have an obligation to
take the right into account when negotiating trade treaties, that states have a tripartite
obligation to ‘respect, protect, and fulfil’ the right, and that the implementation of any
retrogressive policy will usually constitute a violation.147 In the next section, the High
Commissioner analyzes the outcomes of particular forms of services liberalization,
emphasizing the negative outcomes that can arise. For example, foreign direct investment
in health services can result, it is argued, in a “two-tiered service supply with a corporate
segment focussed on the healthy and wealthy and an underfinanced public sector
focussing on the poor and the sick”. Similarly, “the introduction of user fees can reduce
and even cut off service supply to the poor”.148 In order to ensure that services
liberalization works for human rights, the High Commissioner therefore observes, strict
monitoring and strong regulatory oversight of private service supplies will often be
essential.149 In the next section, the High Commissioner analyzes the extent to which the
disciplines in the GATS may actually impede the ability of governments to provide such
regulatory oversight, and therefore their ability to protect human rights. The report
therefore argues that WTO Members ought to take a cautious approach to making GATS
commitments, that the GATS ought to be construed in various ways which allow greater
policy space for social regulation, and that a mechanism should be put in place to ensure
that Members can withdraw commitments where services liberalization ultimately
undermines the enjoyment of human rights.150
Of course, there are innumerable other examples I might have used. Precisely the same
structure of argumentation has been used to claim that the right to health requires
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amendments to Article 31(f) of the TRIPs agreement,151 that the right to food requires the
reduction of domestic agricultural subsidies in industrialized countries,152 that the right to
health requires WTO dispute settlement bodies to take a deferential attitude to
precautionary food safety legislation,153 and so on.
The question which interests me is what role human rights norms and principles play in
this kind of analysis? It is common to talk as if human rights are in some sense the source
of the ultimate policy prescriptions in this kind of analysis – that human rights rules
provide the criteria by which to arbitrate between alternative trade policy proposals. In
fact, it takes only a moment’s thought to realise that precisely the opposite is occurring:
human rights commentators are drawing on work produced by leading trade policy
experts, in the context of contemporary trade policy debates as a source of policy ideas
and arguments. There is invariably something of a shift in register when these
commentators move from the first stage of their argument (the elaboration of human
rights norms), to the second (the evaluation of particular trade policy proposals). When it
comes to the analysis and evaluation of concrete policy proposals – and remember that
within this model the elaboration of concrete proposals is precisely the point of the
intervention – the discussion invariably tends to reproduce and rehearse precisely the
same kinds of arguments which characterize trade policy discussions in other arenas, and
which are perfectly familiar to trade policy experts. At this point, the human rights
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language recedes into the background, and we are presented with a series of
argumentative steps, sets of data, and ultimately policy prescriptions, which almost
exactly reproduce those emanating from more traditional trade policy circles.
The point is that essentially all of the intellectual heavy lifting in these analyses is not
done by human rights norms at all, but by precisely the kinds of technical argumentation
which human rights purport to augment. After all, we don’t need human rights to tell us
that private providers of essential services need strict regulatory oversight. Nor do we
need human rights to tell us that domestic agricultural subsidies ought to be reduced, nor
that developing countries may at times need the flexibility to impose tariffs on
agricultural imports. It is clear that what is actually happening in this kind of scholarship
is that policy proposals and supporting arguments are being borrowed from contemporary
trade policy discourse, and re-articulated in human rights terms. I am not suggesting that
human rights commentators tend to reproduce orthodox opinion on these questions. In
fact, the opposite is almost always the case: human rights have come to be seen as a
language for articulating counter-orthodox critique of certain kinds of prevailing trade
policy consensus. But, regardless of the substantive positions taken, the point is that the
discussion of trade policy matters draws on precisely the same set of arguments, in
essentially the same way, as have characterized trade policy discussions for some time.
Any policy proposals which are put forward in these analyses therefore cannot
meaningfully be said to be derived from human rights norms in any direct way, and in
fact usually appear to have only an attenuated and relatively obscure connection to the
human rights obligations set out at the start.
The result is that one can often be left wondering why it is necessary for these policy
proposals to be framed in human rights terms.154 There may even be positive
disadvantages in doing so. First, and most simply, framing the argument in human rights
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terms seems merely to confuse matters, and to add an extra, unnecessary, layer of
analysis. Would it not be better and simpler for policy-makers to engage directly with the
pros and cons of policy proposals, without having these arguments mediated through the
prism of human rights? Second, re-framing traditional trade policy arguments in human
rights terms may unhelpfully mystify policy debates: to speak as if particular trade policy
choices were somehow mandated by human rights rules risks obscuring their
contestability, lending them a falsely inflated legitimacy, and stifling ongoing debate
about desirable trade policy. After all, whether or not they are put forward by human
rights actors, these proposals may be mistaken, or superseded by better or different
knowledge, and ought always to be open to question. Third, there is the risk that this kind
of intervention can undermine the legitimacy and effectiveness of human rights
themselves, by promising more than can be delivered. Within this framework, human
rights are offered as a means of determining right or wrong answers to trade policy
questions, a means of conclusively determining better or worse trade policy. The more
that human rights actors try to make good this promise – that is, the more that they
attempt to turn human rights principles into concrete policy proposals – then the more the
trade and human rights debate becomes just another debate about the optimality of
particular trade policies, a subject on which human rights actors have no particularly
special expertise. Within this frame, human rights actors find themselves simply playing
the role of a conduit: passive recipients of technical knowledge produced elsewhere, rearticulating that knowledge in the language of human rights. As a result, the peculiar
authority of human rights themselves can be dissipated, as it becomes equated with the
persuasiveness of the technical knowledge on which it draws, and with the mastery by
human rights actors of technical trade policy knowledge.
Let me finish this section with two clarifications. First, I am not suggesting that framing
trade policy arguments in human rights terms performs no beneficial function. On the
contrary, in the sections which follow I try to spell out a number of other very important
functions that it performs very usefully. My basic claim is rather that we need to be clear
about what kind of work human rights is doing in this kind of analysis, and what it is not.
I do not think that human rights are providing substantive guidance for policy-makers,
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and it seems to me counter-productive to claim that this is what is happening. Second, I
also am not suggesting that human rights rules cannot be developed and used in a way
which gives concrete direction to trade policy-makers. My claim is merely that present
attempts to do that end up as not much more than a process of reflecting and rearticulating policy proposals and arguments already circulating in trade policy debates.
We need to look elsewhere, and think harder, if we are to understand the role that human
rights norms play in contemporary trade policy debates.
3.

Human rights as political technologies

When one asks NGOs and other commentators why they use the language of human
rights in their critiques of the trade regime, one of the most common responses is that
human rights rhetoric can add weight to the policy arguments that they make. Even if we
do not need human rights to tell us that domestic agricultural subsidies ought to be
reduced, so this argument typically runs, it is helpful to be able to say authoritatively that
this reduction is required by human rights law, because it endows that claim with a
degree of moral legitimacy, the force of legal obligation, and a sense that they are
somehow beyond the possibility of compromise or negotiation. In short, the deployment
of human rights language is said to make policy/political claims more persuasive and
ultimately more effective. The legal framework human rights provide is often said to be
particularly important. There seems to be a perception that, through the trade regime,
certain powerful interests have been able to entrench their trade policy preferences in
binding legal form, and that human rights law provides a (satisfyingly symmetrical)
means of contesting that political move in kind. Human rights, it is often said, are not just
“aspirational moral principles”, they are “norms codified in international law”.155
However these arguments are framed, the fundamental point is clear: that the human
rights movement offers a variety of political technologies which may be used to achieve
desirable trade policy outcomes, and that the use of human rights language makes
available a variety of strategies which can be used to exert considerable political pressure.
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The techniques typically used by human rights actors to achieve political outcomes can
take a number of forms.156 First, the characterization of particular aspects of trade policy
as ‘human rights issues’ can help to mobilize transnational human rights advocacy
networks. These networks have proved to be effective mechanisms for raising public
awareness, shaping public opinion, uniting disparate political actors, and generating
broad-based global consensuses in favour of particular policy objectives. They can bring
powerful pressures to bear on policy-makers through grassroots campaigning and direct
lobbying efforts. In the context of trade policy, the TRIPS and public health campaign is
an obvious example. The engagement of UN human rights bodies on this issue, and the
consequent mobilization of the human rights movement more generally, in my view
influenced the dynamic of that debate in powerful ways. Human rights institutions and
actors added weight to the campaign for the modification of TRIPS commitments, by
lending additional legitimacy, new constituencies, and an institutional voice for those
groups pressuring for change. The deployment of human rights language also helped to
frame the debate in terms of justice and fairness, and through the mobilization of moral
outrage, helped to generate a widespread sense that the TRIPS agreement in its current
form could not be justified. Experience with this campaign has had the result that many
human rights actors in the field of international trade now see their primary role as
working closely with activist or lobby groups – particular those with a developing
country focus – demonstrating to them how human rights language and human rights law
might be strategically deployed to help their achieve their policy agenda. Similarly,
others work hard to get particular trade policy projects on the agenda of human rights
institutions, and use any resulting resolutions or reports as a tool in ongoing advocacy
and lobbying efforts.157
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Second, as Helfer has noted, the human rights regime can provide an institutional space
for the development of norms about trade policy which are different from, and contrary
to, those circulating within the trade regime.158 Soft law instruments and declarations
produced by consensus within a human rights framework can then feed back into the
trade regime, as other countries seek to use such norms as a lever in trade negotiations,
exploiting the “civilising force of hypocrisy” to extract concessions in the domain of
trade politics.159 A submission to the Committee on Agriculture by a number of
developing countries, in the context of a review of how the Agreement on Agriculture
might address ‘non-trade’ concerns, provides an interesting example of this process.160 In
this submission, these developing countries referred explicitly to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and to the work of the CESCR on the right to food in
support of their proposals for reform to the agreement. While it is hard to say how
effective this strategy might be in any particular context, a number of commentators have
drawn attention to this example as illustrative of the general potential of such
strategies.161 Third, the elaboration of international human rights law relating to trade
policy may provide an impetus for the use of domestic human rights enforcement
mechanisms to influence governments’ trade policy positions. The most obvious example
comes from South Africa, where proceedings were initiated on the basis of the
constitutional right to health, in respect of health policies closely related to the TRIPS
and public health campaign.162
Fourth, international human rights treaty-monitoring bodies may help to generate
pressure for policy change in a variety of ways. CESCR, for example, routinely examines
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certain aspects of countries’ trade policies for their consistency with human rights norms.
In a recent country review of Ecuador, the CESCR heard submissions from NGOs
concerned about the potential impact of FTAA and US-Andean FTA negotiations on
access to medicines in Ecuador, and expressed concern to the Ecuadorean
representative.163 It is true that such review processes are of varying effectiveness in
achieving real policy change, and rely on softer processes of awareness-raising,
persuasion and normative socialization to work. But while a degree of scepticism is
useful, at the same time we should not write these processes too quickly as ineffective.
There is evidence that the Ecuadorean representative in question at least forcefully
transmitted CESCR’s concern to those government departments involved in trade
negotiations, and began a process of involving human rights norms in the crafting of
negotiating positions.164 It has been suggested that such processes are more effective in
the case of smaller countries, simply because the same official represents the country in
both the trade and human rights regimes.
This strategic deployment of human rights language, and human rights mechanisms, can
be critiqued on a number of grounds. Some critique it on the basis of the desirability of
the policy proposals advocated. I have previously said that the substantive merits of
human rights claims are beyond the scope of this article, so I cannot engage in detail with
these arguments here. Suffice to say that while it is true that the policy agenda advanced
under the banner of human rights may in principle be mistaken, counter-productive or
covertly deployed for the benefit of the powerful, it is also true that so far most aspects of
this policy agenda – amendment of the TRIPS agreement, the reduction of domestic
agricultural support, further special and differential treatment for developing countries –
have enjoyed broad-based public support. Others critique this framework on the basis of
its effectiveness. There are numerous commentators who are sceptical of the ability of the
‘soft’ mechanisms of the human rights regime to achieve real political change. In relation
to the TRIPS and public health campaign, for example, Picciotto suggests that
163
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[a]lthough the political impact of the campaign has been very important, especially due to the
global awareness of the AIDS issue, it is doubtful that the invocation of human rights
discourses has had more than a marginal effect. The same can be said of the global campaign
that resulted in the compromise in the Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
and Public Health and its subsequent implementation by WTO Council Decisions.

Even if one concedes the effectiveness of human rights mechanisms in other fields of
policy and politics, there may be reason to doubt their practical utility in respect of
international economic matters. Human rights institutions are still in the process of
building up their authority and legitimacy in relation to these matters, and arguably are
not yet in a position to speak as persuasively on international economic matters as they
are in other fields. Furthermore, the human rights movement is also still building the
necessary links with policy-makers to make direct lobbying efforts practically effective.
At the same time, one ought not to draw conclusions too quickly: ultimately, it is an
empirical question what practical effect the human rights movement may have on the
political dynamics of trade policy in the longer term, and one which it is difficult to
predict in advance.
My primary concern about this model is somewhat different. It is that in this model the
human rights movement still is given no role in policy debates – that is, in generating new
ideas about desirable and appropriate trade policy, or alternative visions of the
international trading system. That is to say, in this model the human rights movement
does not engage in the domain of policy ideas and policy knowledge. It is still figured as
a passive recipient of policy knowledge, and is seen as being deployed in the service of a
policy agenda still defined in the context of traditional trade policy debates. Trade policy
elites, deploying traditional conceptual frameworks, still play the role of gatekeepers of
policy ideas, monopolizing the production, evaluation and authorization of acceptable
policy proposals. Thus, the human rights movement can be effective in achieving positive
change only where the ‘problem’ is not lack of imagination but rather the lack of political
will. It may be a useful tool, that is to say, where we know what policy ought to be
pursued, but where mobilizing constituencies in favour of it, and overcoming political
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obstacles to change, is difficult. The human rights movement can do nothing, however, to
remedy those flaws in the international trading order which arise as a consequence of
prevailing policy knowledge – or rather as a consequence of its flaws, blindspots and
other inadequacies. The influence of human rights actors is most likely to be strong
where they are advocating policies consistent with the prevailing technical knowledge,
and necessarily weaker and less convincing where they choose to advocate policies
supported only by unorthodox or non-mainstream experts. Put another way, to the extent
that the international trading system is already structured and informed by orthodox
knowledge – and in my view this is a very significant extent – the human rights
movement has in this model no critical or transformative power at all.
4.

Human rights as a trigger for policy learning

Let me turn, then, to confront this problem directly. I have said that the human rights
movement must engage in the domain of knowledge, because transformative change to
the international trading order cannot easily occur without the production of ‘new
thinking’ about the kinds of trade policies which are desirable and legitimate, and the
kinds of governance structures through which political power is constituted and exercised
in the trading order. I have suggested that none of the three models considered in the
previous section provide any solid basis for thinking about how the human rights
movement may be involved in that production. While it is common to speak as if human
rights norms may provide the substance of an alternative vision for the international
trading order, in my view that promise is illusory. Furthermore, the discourse of
fragmentation and coherence – propagated in part within the trade and human rights
debate – may actually make such ‘new thinking’ more difficult, by reinforcing prevailing
views and entrenching the hold of traditional experts over them. Does this mean that, in
the end, the human rights movement has only a marginal role to play in the ongoing
evolution of the trading system? The answer is still not clear, but I think not, and in this
section my aim is to sketch, in preliminary form, a fourth model for the engagement of
the human rights movement in trade policy debates to explain why. Put most simply, the
claim I make is that the human rights movement can facilitate the production of new
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forms of policy knowledge about the trading system. Even if human rights are not in
themselves a source of new policy ideas, human rights interventions into trade policy
debates perform the crucial function of providing a trigger for ‘policy learning’, and
helping to create the conditions in which learning is more likely. That is to say, the
engagement of human rights voices and actors in trade debates acts as an impetus for the
evolution of ideas about what is rational and desirable trade policy.
The kind of ‘policy learning’ that I have in mind can take a number of different forms,
and occur in a number of different ways.165 First, it may involve a change in the nature of
‘causal beliefs’ held by policy-makers. Contemporary ideas about desirable trade policy
rest on particular understandings about the economic dynamics of the trading system: the
impact of trade flows on allocative and dynamic efficiency; the relationship between
factor endowments and patterns of international trade; the causal determinants of the
changing size, composition and direction of trade flows; and so on. They also rest on
another set of causal understandings about the political dynamics of the trade system –
such as the belief that the dynamics of domestic trade politics predispose governments
towards protectionism, or the belief that retaliation is the likely result of a unilateral
decision to raise trade barriers. One form of learning, then, consists of a modification or
refinement of this kind of causal belief. Second, learning may involve changes to ‘policy
beliefs’, that is, ideas about the kinds of policies which ought to be pursued in light of our
best understanding of the causal dynamics of the trading system. These can themselves be
broken down into a number of levels. At the lowest level, there can be an evolution in
prevailing ideas about the best technical means of achieving policy goals. In the context
of the WTO, this may involve changing ideas about what bargaining position to take
within multilateral trade negotiations. At the national level, it may involve fine-tuning
ideas about which sectors to liberalize, in what order, and what kinds of flanking policies
are needed to make a program of liberalization successful. At a somewhat deeper level,

165

See generally, J.S. Levy, 'Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield', (1994) 48(2)
International Organization 279.

74

learning can involve a change to ‘strategic policy beliefs’.166 In the international context,
prevailing strategic beliefs may include: the belief that liberalization is most effectively
achieved through the exchange of reciprocal trade concessions; the belief that questions
related to the distributive and equity effects of the international trading system ought to
be addressed at the national level; or the belief that the international trade regime ought
ideally to strive for universality in its membership and coverage. Finally, at the deepest
level, learning can involve a change in nature of the overarching goals towards which
trade policy-making is directed (or the relative weight given to different goals). I noted
above some of the different goals which have informed the operation of the postwar
trading system at different periods in its history.167
Policy learning – at any level – is not an automatic or natural process: certain conditions
and policy-making environments are conducive to learning, while others are not; and
certain organizations are better at learning than others.168 Without more detailed study, it
is hard to speak in general terms about the extent to which the international trade regime
helps to generate a policy-making environment which is conducive to learning. Certainly
it is not hard to point to at least one or two periods in the history of the postwar order in
which policy learning of a profound kind appears to have occurred.169 At the same time,
it is also possible to point to a number of features of the trade regime which inhibit
learning – and it is these obstacles which the activity of the human rights movement helps
to overcome.
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Firstly, and most simply, the work of a variety of organizational theorists reminds us of
the importance of feedback loops in the facilitation of organizational learning.170 Causal
and policy beliefs change through response to environmental stimuli – in other words,
through the process of continuously monitoring the outcomes of policy choices, and by
systematically incorporating the lessons learnt into processes of policy formation and reformation. The international trade regime, however, has always lacked a systematic,
institutionalized system of monitoring the impact of decisions taken within it, and feeding
back lessons learnt into new decision-making processes.171 It is true that the committee
system established with the WTO in 1995 to some degree began to reflexively monitor
the activity of the WTO. However, these monitoring activities are focussed primarily on
questions of compliance and implementation, rather than on reflexively evaluating the
effects and outcomes of the WTO agreements itself. By contrast, over the past decade or
so, human rights actors – and indeed transnational civil society networks more generally
– have helped to perform precisely this function. A very large proportion of the work
undertaken by human rights actors consists of collecting and collating information on the
outcomes produced by the international trading system, formulating it into a relatively
coherent and systematic body of knowledge, and repeatedly bringing it to the attention of
trade policy-making elites. In doing so, they have helped to provide the impetus for
learning by these policy-makers – that is, for a rethinking of beliefs which these policymakers hold concerning how the trading system operates, and what the outcomes of their
interventions are likely to be.
Of course, there are certainly ways in which human rights might more effectively be used
to perform this function. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has very
strongly advocated integrating a human-rights based feedback function more closely into
trade policy-making processes, at both the national and international levels. The High
Commissioner suggests the need for a “a constant examination of trade law and policy”,
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arguing that “assessing the potential and real impact of trade policy law and policy is
perhaps the principal means of avoiding implementation of any retrogressive
measure”.172 The High Commissioner therefore repeatedly calls for systematic ‘human
rights impact assessments’ both before and after decision are made.173 Taking up this
challenge, a number of preliminary attempts have been made to set out methodologies for
carrying out such assessments.174 In my view, this work represents a valuable attempt to
use human rights to drive policy learning in more effective ways – that is, to use human
rights law to institutionalize and routinize practices of monitoring and feedback within
trade policy-making processes.
Secondly, the human rights movement can help initiate reflection on the broader goals
and values which the trading system is designed to achieve, and the responsibilities which
trade policy-makers see themselves as bearing. Commentators such as Barnett and
Finnemore have noted that there can be a tendency in international organizations for the
broader goals associated with an institutional project to fade from view over time, and
institutional actors to focus on institutionalized rules, routines, practices and procedures
in themselves and for their own sake.175 The result can be a lack of any critical reflection
on those original goals and the broader project which gives the institution its direction, to
determine whether they need to be updated as circumstances change. There are certainly
indications of this dynamic in the context of the trade regime. It is reflected not only in
the relative lack of discussion of the issue, but also in the fact that, to the extent that the
purpose of the trading system is discussed, commentators generally settle for ‘thin’ and
stylized versions – such as the liberalization of international trade, or the reduction of
trade barriers – which say nothing meaningful about the social purpose of the regime.
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Again, it is clear that the human rights movement has at least the potential to counter-act
these tendencies, and to help create an environment in which reflection on the trade
policy goals is facilitated and encouraged. One of the most obvious characteristics of
human rights interventions into trade debates is their preoccupation with the ultimate
ends to which the international trading system is directed, and in particular the claim that
trade liberalization ought not be pursued as if it were ‘an end in itself”. While I have
made it clear that I do not think ‘human rights’ themselves necessarily provide a vision of
the most appropriate ends towards which the trade regime ought to be striving176, human
right actors have nevertheless been instrumental in generating something of a renewed
critical debate about the social purposes of the international trading system. By forcing
the trade regime to justify its activities and policies according to ethical criteria, it has
helped to prompt reflexive questioning of both the means and ends of trade policy, and
thereby to facilitate policy learning at the deepest level.
Third, and perhaps most important, human rights networks can help to overcome
cognitive obstacles to trade policy learning.177 Institutionalized processes of monitoring
environmental feedback, and encouraging critical reflection, are not always sufficient to
generate learning. The production of new knowledge can still be impeded by the
cognitive frameworks which trade policy-makers use to make sense of the world, and to
draw lessons from past experience. These epistemological frameworks can be deeply
embedded and highly resistant to change: even when faced with unexpected and seriously
adverse policy outcomes, it has been shown that decision-makers often tend to draw
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lessons which reinforce their pre-existing beliefs.178 Institutions and organizations which
are designed and rationalized on the basis of particular ways of seeing the world also tend
to perpetuate and entrench such worldviews, and can impede vital cognitive change. For
example, many of the ‘strategic policy beliefs’ mentioned earlier – that liberalization is
best conducted reciprocally and progressively, or that the distributive outcomes of
international trade ought not to be the business of the trade regime – are deeply engrained
in the architecture of the trade regime. They are sustained, disseminated and given a
‘commonsense’ character through institutional practices and procedures; routines and
habits; histories and narratives; and a variety of discursive and institutional processes at
work within the trade regime. The institutional features of the trade regime, in other
words, do not simply guide participants’ behaviour, but also teach them a particular way
of understanding the trading system, and of how political power ought to be deployed
within it.
The human rights movement can help to overcome these obstacles, by providing an
alternative environment for the generation and dissemination of knowledge about the
trading system, which is not subject to the same cognitive constraints. To take a simple
example, I said above that our knowledge of the impacts of international trade has
traditionally tended to focus on a limited set of questions – such as the impact of trade on
growth, on resource allocation, on industrial competitiveness, or on relative factor
returns. Since this kind of knowledge is relatively well-understood, authoritative,
developed and familiar, these factors tend to figure prominently in decisions about what
kind of trade policy to pursue, and are prominent feature in the policy evaluations which
occur in and around international trade negotiations. In human rights discourse, however,
different preoccupations tend to be given prominence. For example, the human rights
movement tends focus on the impact of trade policy on access to food, on the livelihoods
of the rural poor, on women and other vulnerable groups, on health, and so on. As the
High Commissioner has observed, “a human rights approach tends to examine trade law
and policy [differently], focussing not only on economic growth, markets or economic
development but also on health systems, education, water supply, food security, labour,
178
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political processes, and so on.”179 Human rights, therefore, offers the possibility of
influencing trade policy by reshaping the kinds of knowledge on which policy choices are
based.
How might this work in practice? The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH)
has suggested that human rights actors “undertake empirical studies and evaluations” of
the impact of trade liberalization on factors and indicators of particular relevance to their
work.180 This may mean that such actors generate original research and new data, based
on the experience of “advocates working on the ground”. More commonly, however, it
will involve collecting and collating available data, “collaborat[ing] with partners
engaged in data analysis”, and exploring ways of integrating their work with other actors
involved in knowledge production and dissemination.181 In this model, the human rights
movement helps to re-shape the kind of knowledge which is produced about the trading
system by engaging in collaborative work with traditional knowledge producers, asking
new questions of these experts, providing a pre-existing network for the dissemination
and circulation of new findings, as well as offering an institutional space in which new
knowledge can be brought to the attention of policy-makers at the international level. For
example, human rights actors have been at the forefront of collaborative efforts to
produce new data on the impact of international trade policies on women and gender
equality.182 This work has in turn helped to generate interest in the subject in more
traditional venues of knowledge production, such as universities and think-tanks,183 and
thereby to redefine the domain of relevant knowledge which is deployed in trade policy
debates. In this way, human rights actors are arguably helping to generate practices
through such knowledge is routinely taken into account in the kinds of strategic
calculations which governments use to determine their trade policy interests.
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The human rights movement has influenced not only what information tends to be
produced about the trading system, but also how that information is interpreted. In order
to transform raw information about the outcomes of the trading system into usable policy
knowledge, such information needs to be embedded within narratives and thick causal
descriptions, which give meaning to this information, and suggest ways of responding to
it. These processes are inescapably social: they involve the production of collective
meanings and policy narratives, and the generation of broadly shared cognitive
frameworks. Human rights can help in this collective processing of information into new
knowledge by providing an repertoire of discursive and cognitive resources – habits of
thought, concepts, images and principles – different from those available in traditional
trade policy discourse. These alternative discursive resources help to generate different
interpretive frameworks through which information about the trading system is
processed. Such interpretive frameworks are of course highly contingent – what is
produced does not, in other words, amount to a ‘human rights perspective’ on the trade
regime in any simple sense.
While it is difficult to give examples without crude over-generalization, two illustrations
might help to make the point clearer. First, much of the discussion in and around the trade
regime is structured by an image of politics as a series of collective action dilemmas: in
part as a result, the regime has defined its task as enabling the co-operative, mutual
reduction of barriers to international trade. Human rights discourse, however, tends to see
politics as a power struggle: the core problem posed by the international trading system,
therefore, is to ensure that the benefits of the trading system accrue to the most vulnerable
and marginalized groups. In this way, human rights discourse can help to generate new
problem definitions for trade policy questions. Second, as mentioned earlier, traditional
trade policy discourse tends to view resistance to liberal trade as the natural state of
politics, protectionism as the outcome of pressure from ‘special interest’ groups, and
consumers and exporters as the carriers of the ‘public interest’. By contrast,
contemporary human rights discourse understands these political dynamics in different
terms, tending to see those in favour of liberal trade as (predatory) special interest groups.
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Various actors such as civil society groups, and certain kinds of producers, tend to be
discursively constructed as carriers of the public interest. The result can be that trade and
human rights discourse generate very different narratives to explain and give meaning to
similar social phenomena. The point I am making is a general one: that human rights can
help to provide a social space, and the cognitive resources, to aid in the restructuring of
our knowledge about the trading system, and the reframing of trade policy questions. In
doing so, it can help to overcome the cognitive rigidities which currently impede trade
policy learning.
Though it is rarely made explicit, in my view the human rights movement is therefore
very much in the game of knowledge production. When human rights actors produce
their numerous commentaries on the ‘human rights impact’ of the trading system, and so
on, one of the most important functions they are performing is facilitating the production
of social knowledge: generating shared narratives; synthesizing some kind of consensus
about how certain aspects of the trading system operate; and selecting, reframing and
imparting new meaning to information produced by various kinds of trade policy experts.
The knowledge thereby produced can, of course, influence policy-makers directly,
helping them to reformulate their strategies and explicit policy preferences. Just as
important, however, is the destabilizing role it plays in respect of traditional trade
debates. It facilitates the reconsideration and renewal of such debates by highlighting
their inevitable cognitive limitations, and by demonstrating that traditional trade experts
have no monopoly on the truths which can be told about the trading system. As Jacobsen
has noted in a different context, it is precisely the “public clashes” among different
communities, and among different regimes of truth, that can often yield “the most
valuable and self-critical input into policy decisions”.184 It is in my view one of the most
productive functions that the human rights movement has so far performed in trade policy
debates, and one which, if made more explicit, may usefully guide their future
interventions.
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Recognizing and making explicit this conception of the function of human rights has
implications for the kind of activities that human rights actors engage in, as well as for
the kind of scholarship which is produced in the context of the trade and human rights
debate. Instead of focussing attention on elaborating more detailed human rights norms,
on spelling out their apparent implications for particular trade policy questions, and on
constructing an entire international legal system to complement and counteract WTO law
on the international level, human rights actors may prefer to focus on performing
effectively as a knowledge network. Precisely what this looks like will naturally be
worked out over time, but it may involve highlighting and paying closer attention to those
questions to which trade policy experts traditionally do not address themselves, providing
an impetus for the production of knowledge on those questions, as well as creating a
space in which such knowledge will be heard. It may involve providing social and
institutional mechanisms for the distribution and exchange of such information, helping
to transform it from mere information into the kind of processed – and, crucially, shared
– knowledge about the trading system which informs policy-making on an ongoing basis.
It may also involve more explicit and directed mechanisms for bringing such knowledge
to the attention of relevant policy-makers.
5.

Challenging technical rationality

There is a fifth and final model about what human rights bring to trade policy debates
which it is worth outlining briefly. I drew a distinction at the beginning of this Part
between ‘primary’ trade policy ideas (beliefs about what kinds of trade policy are best),
and ‘secondary’ trade policy ideas (beliefs about how to judge what kinds of trade policy
are best). I suggested that, at the level of secondary ideas, trade policy-making is deeply
structured by beliefs that trade policy is specialized technical field, and that the
determination of the best trade policy is best left to trained experts. Arguably, however,
contemporary controversies about the international trade regime are in part the result of a
widespread loss of faith in technical expertise. We are less sure than we have ever been
of the ability of experts to fully – or even adequately – understand the world, and are less
convinced than we have ever been of the ‘rationality’ and desirability of their policy
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prescriptions. The engagement of human rights into trade policy debates is arguably both
an effect and a cause of this decline of faith in ‘expertise’ (and all that that word implies).
It is an effect in the sense that it is part of a more general search for new actors and new
languages to augment trade policy debates. It is a cause in the sense that human rights
discourse provides us with a different set of ideas about ‘how to judge what kinds of trade
policy are best’ – specifically, a set of ideas which prominently includes notions of
procedural fairness, and distributive justice. Human rights, on this view, offer the
possibility of transforming the governance of trade by prompting us to rethink the
normative framework which tells us what represents an authoritative and legitimate
intervention into questions of trade policy.
To a significant degree, we are accustomed to judging trade policy by how closely it
conforms to substantive policy prescriptions established in the relevant economic
literature. But human rights actors have been prominent among those making the claim
that we ought not to judge trade policy (and the trade regime) solely by its substantive
rationality, but also by its procedural rationality.185 The UN High Commissioner for
Human Rights, for example, sees an urgent need to increase the breadth and depth of
public participation in trade policy-making processes, including in the WTO itself.186
This may involve giving civil society actors “direct access to WTO meetings and
decision-making processes”, potentially developing “mechanisms of redress” for
individuals affected by decisions taken in the international trade regime, or being more
willing to take the content of amicus curiae briefs into account in dispute settlement, as
“a means of strengthening civil society’s participation in the multilateral trading
system”.187 Moreover, the High Commissioner argues, international institutions such as
the WTO must see it as part of their mission to encourage participation in policy-making
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at the national level.188 Recent calls for WTO dispute settlement panels to concentrate on
procedural review of national trade policy measures reflect a similar turn.189 The High
Commissioner has also emphasized the need for transparency in the WTO, “so that the
outcomes of … negotiation processes are open to public scrutiny”.190 The point here is
that human rights norms are being deployed to challenge our ideas about how trade
policy proposals ought to be judged, and by whom. Within this human rights framework,
what matters is not so much whether international trade policies are right or wrong,
according to certain technical criteria, but rather who made them, and how. Human rights
are, in other words, helping to reconstitute our ideas of what is a valuable and worthwhile
contribution to trade policy-making processes, and who is in a position to provide such a
contribution.
Human rights discourse also focusses our attention on questions of distributive justice.
Bureaucratic international organizations, particularly those like the WTO which rely
heavily on technical expertise as an important source of their legitimacy, tend to structure
their activity so that questions of distributive justice appear irrelevant to their tasks. This
is because their continuing authority depends crucially on an appearance of apolitical
neutrality.191 One implication has been that explicit evaluation of trade policy from the
perspective of distributive justice concerns has been discouraged, and notions of fairness
have therefore played a relatively minor role in shaping the activity and operation of the
international trade regime.192 Human rights discourse can help to counteract this trend.
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Human rights have over the last decade or so provided a language and an institutional
space in which concerns about justice and about the fairness of the international trading
order have been articulated, and brought to the forefront of our attention. Human rights
actors have drawn attention in particular to what they call the unfair treatment of
developing countries in the trade regime: the stricter level of obligations imposed in
practice on developing countries; the disproportionately small share of the benefits of
international trade that they receive; and the difficulties they face in implementing their
obligations (and in convincing developed countries to fulfil theirs). Human rights actors
have also been instrumental in developing and disseminating knowledge about the
distributive impact of international trade within countries. In the present context, the
importance of this work is that it has helped to generate a consensus that we ought to
judge the international trading order primarily by its fairness (not solely its rationality),
and that desirable trade policy is above all just trade policy. And this consensus in turn
has contributed to a change in trade policy debates, so that we have begun once more to
discuss and debate what ‘fairness’ means in international economic relations193, what
different forms fairness may take, how a more equitable international economic order
might realistically be achieved.

4.

CONCLUSION

This paper began with a conviction that the time had come for a critical appraisal of the
foundation, shape and direction of the present trade and human rights literature. It will be
clear by now that the purpose of this exercise is intended to be constructive. While there
is no doubt that engagement between trade and human rights scholars is to be desired,
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and similarly no doubt that the trade and human rights literature has to date produced
some important and highly productive work, there are in my view still some significant
gaps and flaws in the assumptions and modes of argumentation characteristic of the
contemporary debate. The critiques I make are intended to help put that literature on a
surer conceptual footing going forward, so as to facilitate a more sustained, direct and
productive engagement between trade and human rights institutions, languages, scholars
and communities.
Although my argument is divided into two distinct halves, both fundamentally stem from
my interest in the way that international law and international regimes shape the way we
think. The first half of my argument, then, is that insufficient attention is paid to the ways
in which the trade regime shapes the way trade policy-makers think (and therefore act).
We almost exclusively think of the trade regime in one-dimensional terms as a set of
formally binding rules constraining the behaviour of its Members. In the trade and human
rights literature, this translates into a preoccupation with the ways in which trade law
constrains the ability of governments to pursue human rights policies and fulfil their
human rights obligations. Criticism and proposals for change therefore focus on ‘getting
the rules right’, and in particular on removing excessive constraints and opening up
sufficient ‘policy space’ for WTO Members. But the trade regime is much more than a
set of binding rules. It is a social environment in which ideas about the best and most
appropriate trade policies are generated, legitimated and disseminated. It is a cognitive
environment in which states are taught states how to interpret the international economic
order, and how to calculate their interests in it. And it is also an institutional environment
which re-shapes the mix of actors involved in trade policy-making, and the avenues of
influence available to them. The reason that recognizing these different functions of the
trade regime is important only partly because they too ‘affect human rights’, and the
critical eye of human rights scholars should therefore be trained on them. It is also
important because they represent some of the most significant mechanisms by which the
trade regime might be engaged in re-building a different and better international
economic order. They represent the means by which the trade regime can help us to
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rethink our ideas about what constitutes a desirable international trading order, and help
us to imagine a new future for it.
The second half of my argument is that insufficient attention is paid to the ways in which
the human rights movement can help to re-shape the way trade policy-makers think (and
therefore act). When human rights actors attempt to engage in debates about what trade
policy ought to be, they run up against very powerful beliefs that they do not have the
expertise to speak authoritatively on these matters – at least not in their capacity as
human rights experts. Sometimes, the result is that human rights actors act primarily as
passive recipients of trade policy knowledge, so that the ‘trade agenda’ of the human
rights movement becomes essentially a re-articulation of proposals and arguments
already in circulation. At other times, the debate is re-cast as a confrontation between two
different types of expertise, responding to two different kinds of social demands – trade
liberalization and the protection of human rights. I have suggested that, for all the
avenues they open, these two responses ultimately lead the debate away from the most
important issues. However, I also suggested that human rights actors are involved in
generating ‘new thinking’ about desirable trade policy, even if not in any simple or direct
way. The human rights movement has helped to facilitate policy learning by helping to
create an environment in which such new thinking is made more likely. And it has helped
to re-shape prevailing knowledge about desirable and rational trade policy by modifying
the conditions in which such knowledge is produced. I suggested that there is
nevertheless scope for human rights actors to re-focus and target their interventions so as
to perform these functions more effectively.
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